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KILLING US SWEETLY: HOW TO TAKE
INDUSTRY OUT OF THE FDA
Jason luliano*
For more than a century, the Food and Drug Administration
has claimed to protect the public health. During that time, it has
actually been placing corporate profits above consumer safety. No-
where is this corruption more evident than in the approval of artifi-
cial sweeteners. FDA leaders' close ties to the very industry they
were supposed to be regulating present a startling picture. Ignoring
warnings from both independent scientists and their own review
panels, FDA decision makers let greed guide their actions. They
approved carcinogenic sweeteners such as saccharin, aspartame, and
sucralose while simultaneously banning the natural herb stevia be-
cause it would cut into industry profits. This Article proposes two
reforms that can end these corrupt practices and take industry out
of the FDA. By strengthening conflict of interest regulations and
preventing companies from participating in safety trials, the FDA
will be able to gain the independence it needs in order to regulate
the food and drug industries.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a beautiful summer day. As you cruise down the highway,
the sun shines through the windshield, warming your skin. A sign
appears in the distance. It's too far away to read, but you know what
it says anyway: "Beach 10 miles." You can already see the welcom-
ing white sand and feel the refreshing ocean water. Today promises
to be amazing. It's a shame that the next two hours will be the scari-
est moments of your life.
Just as you lean over to turn on your favorite radio station, eve-
rything flips 180 degrees. The ground and sky have traded places.
Your vision indicates that your car is flying upside down through the
air. You clench your eyes shut and brace for the expected impact
with the ground. After a couple of terrifying, but uneventful, sec-
onds, you risk a glance. Surprisingly, your car is gently coasting
down the road. A thankful sigh escapes your lips. This relief, how-
ever, is short-lived as you notice an even more chilling problem.
Although all the other cars are still in their lanes, they appear to be
driving on the ceiling. Adding to the confusion, the sun is shining
up from the floor. It takes a moment to come to this realization, but
you know that, somehow, your vision has become inverted.
Panicked, you slam the brakes and turn the wheel towards the
shoulder of the road. The car comes to a stop right next to the
beach sign. Just another ten miles. You pull out your cell phone
and dial 911. In the blink of an eye, your entire world has literally
turned upside down.
Fifteen minutes later, the emergency room doctors are running
a series of tests. An hour passes; the results come back negative.
Your mother has arrived and is standing at the bedside sobbing.
Seemingly, in defiance of gravity, a tear slips across her cheek and
falls up.
Yet another doctor approaches. He asks an odd question. Do
you drink diet soda? You grumble inwardly, thinking that there are
more pressing matters at hand than your beverage preferences.
Nonetheless, you tell the doctor that you enjoy diet soda from time
to time and happened to drink a few cans this past week. The doc-
tor nods knowingly and informs you that the aspartame in those diet
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sodas is likely producing this frightening experience. He has had a
number of other patients with similar symptoms, and, in those cases,
artificial sweeteners have been linked as the cause. A short while
later, your vision returns to normal, but you vow never to drink diet
soda again.'
Many people's first reaction is that artificial sweeteners could
not be this dangerous. After all, they are FDA-approved, and the
government would not let a harmful chemical enter the food supply.
Unfortunately, their faith rests on a presumption that no longer
holds true.
If only there were an impartial government administration that
regulated the food and drug industries, that agency surely would
have protected the American people from such a toxic substance.
At one time, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) filled this
role, serving as the much needed corporate watchdog, but now, it is
nothing more than a corporate lapdog. Today, any company with
enough money can buy approval for even the most dangerous
products.
There is also a disturbing corollary to this problem. These
same powerful companies can prevent competing products from
getting FDA approval.! Often, the products most easily targeted are
safe, natural substances that cannot be patented. When a new,
healthy product is submitted to the FDA without a large corporate
backer, approval is anything but certain. If a wealthy corporation
fears that this new product will cut into its profit margin, it can put
1. See JOSEPH MERCOLA, SWEET DECEPTION: WHY SPLENDA, NUTRASWEET, AND THE
FDA MAY BE H-AZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH 36 (2006) (describing a similar experi-
ence); see also HYMAN JACK ROBERTS, ASPARTAME DISEASE: AN IGNORED EPIDEMIC 68
(2001) (Roberts clinically observed 1200 patients who had adverse reactions to as-
partame. More than 500 patients experienced vision problems, and 27 of those
suffered blindness in one or both eyes.).
2. See Delays in the FDA's Food Additive Petition Process and GRAS Affirmation
Process: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Rela-
tions of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 104' Cong., at 78 (1995)
(statement of Robert C. Gelardi, Executive Vice President, Calorie Control Council)
(noting that "the careful timing of their submissions can hold up a review numer-
ous times just short of approval"); id. at 90-91 (describing how anonymous submis-
sions are often used to delay FDA approval for competitive reasons.); see H.R. REP.
No. 104-436, at 5, 9 (1995) (Parties have made anonymous submissions with the
sole purpose of delaying agency decisions.); see FDA Delay in Sucralose Approval Gets
"Golden Grinch " Award from Sen. Mathews, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Aug. 29, 1994, at 46
(Sen. Harlan Mathews observed that "'any third party could indefinitely delay ap-
proval of [a food] additive simply by repeatedly submitting their interpretation of
data'"); see also Lars Noah & Richard A. Merril, Starting From Scratch?: Reinventing the
Food Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U.L REV. 329, 330 & 372.
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up huge roadblocks and use its connections to cause the FDA to
reject the application.
Even many FDA employees are unsettled by their agency's ac-
tions.' In a recent poll, more than one-third of FDA scientists be-
lieved that agency leadership is more concerned with rushing prod-
ucts to market than ensuring consumer safety.' To guarantee that
products are approved, FDA leaders often pressure scientists to un-
ethically change data or alter their conclusions.' Due to the close
ties between upper management and the pharmaceutical industry,
the FDA is willing to engage in these untoward practices. Unsurpris-
ingly, sixty percent of researchers knew of instances in which indus-
try had inappropriately influenced the FDA's decisions.
The deception is not limited to internal documents. A full
twenty percent of FDA scientists "have been asked explicitly by FDA
decision makers to provide incomplete, inaccurate or misleading
information to the public, regulated industry, media, or
elected/senior government officials."' This deceit directly subverts
the FDA's mission statement, which lists "helping the public get the
3. See Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58 (allowing industry submissions "brings with it the pos-
sibility for strategic manipulation of the regulatory process in pursuit of anticom-
petitive ends"). We will see this process play out with respect to stevia in Part II.D.
4. Union of Concerned Scientists, Survey: FDA Scientists (2006), http://www.
ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/abuses-ofscience/summary-of-the-fda-scientist.html
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010) ("The results paint a picture of a troubled agency: hun-
dreds of scientists reported significant interference with the FDA's scientific work,
compromising the agency's ability to fulfill its mission of protecting public health
and safety.").
5. Union of Concerned Scientists, Voices of Scientists at FDA: Protecting the Public
Health Depends on Independent Science (2006), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
assets/documents/scientific integrity/fda-survey-brochure.pdf.
6. Id. (Eighteen percent of FDA scientists responded, "I have been asked, for
non-scientific reasons, to inappropriately exclude or alter technical information or
my conclusions in an FDA scientific document."); see also Gardiner Harris, F.D.A
Scientists Accuse Agency Officials of Misconduct, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2008, at Al5.
(According to a letter from FDA scientists to Congress, "Top federal health officials
engaged in 'serious misconduct' by ignoring concerns of scientists at the Food and
Drug Administration and approving for sale unsafe or ineffective medical devices . .
. . The letter says that the scientists have documentary evidence that senior agency
managers 'corrupted the scientific review of medical devices' by ordering experts to
change their opinions and conclusions in violation of the law.").
7. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 5.
8. Id.
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accurate, science-based information they need to use medicines and
foods to improve their health" as a primary goal.'
Unfortunately, nowadays, little things like facts and science are
no longer relevant to agency leaders. Their main concern is speed-
ing products through the approval process so pharmaceutical com-
panies can earn more money at the expense of America's health.
One FDA scientist from the Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search wrote that "[s]cientific discourse is strongly discouraged
when it may jeopardize an approval. . . . Whenever safety or efficacy
concerns are raised on scientific grounds . . . these concerns are not
taken seriously."" Quite simply, FDA leaders have failed our nation,
and the agency has been captured by the very industries it should be
regulating.
On its own website, the FDA plainly states another urgent prob-
lem: "The Food and Drug Administration relies on data that spon-
sors submit to decide whether a drug should be approved."" If the
FDA hopes to promote public health, it cannot trust corporations to
assess the safety and efficacy of their products. The desire to maxi-
mize profits all but guarantees that companies will distort their find-
ings.
In fact, entire industries have thrived by "manufacturing uncer-
tainty."" Big tobacco is the most prominent," but the examples
9. FDA, What We Do, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
default.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
10. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 5.
11. FDA, The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effec-
tive, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucml43534.htm
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
12. See DAVID MICHAELS, DOuBT Is THEIR PRODUCT: How INDUSTRY's ASSAULT ON
SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH x (2008) (defining the strategy of "manufacturing
uncertainty" as "preventing or postponing the regulation of hazardous products by
questioning the science that reveals the hazards in the first place").
13. See id. at 9 (The tobacco industry "worked tirelessly for decades to support
their preordained conclusions and suppress any findings that suggested other-
wise .... The industry understood that the public is in no position to distinguish
good science from bad. Create doubt, uncertainty, and confusion. Throw mud at
the 'antismoking' research under the assumption that some of it is bound to stick.
And buy time . . . ."); see Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Why Review Articles on
the Health Effects of Passive Smoking Reach Different Conclusions, 279 J. AM. MED. AsS'N.
1566, 1566-69 (1998). The authors determined that "the only factor associated with
concluding that passive smoking is not harmful was whether an author was affili-
ated with the tobacco industry." Id. at 1566. They went on to note that the study's
"findings suggest that the tobacco industry may be attempting to influence scientific
opinion by flooding the scientific literature with large numbers of review articles
supporting its position that passive smoking is not harmful to health." Id. at 1569.
352010]
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where corporations have funded scientific studies to manufacture
doubt are legion. Some other notable offenders include asbestos,"
vinyl chloride,'" and lead. 6 This Article will make the case that the
artificial sweetener industry deserves a spot among this illustrious
group.
Part I briefly sets the background for artificial sweeteners by de-
scribing America's obesity epidemic and sugar addiction. Together,
these factors explain why artificial sweeteners have developed into
such a profitable industry. Next, Part II explores the controversies
surrounding the three most popular artificial sweeteners: saccharin,
aspartame, and sucralose. By using artificial sweeteners as a case
study, the article shows why the FDA must be reformed."' This sec-
tion will make it clear that the FDA's close ties to pharmaceutical
companies and the agency's blind reliance on industry-funded sci-
ence are threatening consumer safety. Afterwards, Part II further
stresses the ill effects of agency capture by describing how industry
groups pressured the FDA to ban stevia, a safe, natural sweetener.
After ominously noting that "[t]he Congress and federal agencies are already being
dealt with ... by the Tobacco Institute," one tobacco executive suggested that the
American people must be made to doubt the scientific evidence regarding the
harms of smoking. See Smoking and Health Proposal, Brown & Williamson document
no. 680561778-1786, 4, available at http://legacy.1ibrary.ucsf.edu/tid/nvs40f0.
The tobacco executive wrote, "Doubt is our product since it is the best means of
competing with the 'body of fact' that exists in the minds of the general public. It is
also the means of establishing a controversy." Id.
14. See MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 12-18.
15. See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 173-78 (2003). Although the industry knew of
vinyl chloride's dangers, it "released only the information that would reassure peo-
ple as to the essentially benign nature of the finished products." Id. at 173. This
practice continued for years. "Motivated by money and power rather than health,
the industry was largely successful in hiding its information about cancer from the
government and in deflecting national attention away from the potential hazards . .
." Id. at 178.
16. See id. at 60-64. (After independent studies determined that lead is poison-
ous, the Lead Industry Association "portray[ed] this growing body of scientific lit-
erature as 'prejudice against lead' rather than the documentation of a serious public
health concern. The [Lead Industry Association] still sought to cast doubt on virtu-
ally every report of lead poisoning, focusing on the reports' methodological prob-
lems rather than the underlying reality." To manufacture uncertainty, the lead
industry mounted a "thirty-five year advertising campaign to convince people that
lead was safe.").
17. Change is unlikely to be initiated by the legislative or executive branch. Even
President Clinton instructed the FDA to treat the pharmaceutical companies as
"partners, not adversaries." David Willman, How a New Policy Led to Seven Deadly
Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/nation/la-122001fda,1,539362.story.
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Finally, Part III proposes two potential reforms. Americans must
lock the revolving door and take industry out of the approval proc-
ess. Only then should we trust the FDA with our health.
I. THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC
A. Economic Effects
Calories in - Calories out = Change in bodyweight.
This equation is the key to combating obesity." Start with the
number of calories eaten in a day, and subtract the number of calo-
ries burned. If the result is positive, you gain weight. If it is nega-
tive, you lose weight.
Every 3500 calories adds up to an extra pound." Whether the
caloric excess come from apples or chocolate cake, the same amount
of weight is gained. This means someone can get fat from eating
health foods such as fruits, vegetables, whole grains, and lean meats.
Likewise, one could eat nothing but McDonald's Big Macs and man-
age to lose weight." It all comes down to calories in versus calories
out. The key to weight control really is that simple.
Despite this clear formulation, obesity is a growing problem. In
2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) con-
ducted a study to determine what proportion of Americans have a
weight problem.2' The CDC derived its data by calculating people's
Body Mass Index (BMI)." The following table illustrates how BMI
relates to the various weight categories."
18. See Frank M. Sacks et al., Comparison of Weight-Loss Diets with Diferent Compo-
sitions of Fat, Protein, and Carbohydrates 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 859, 859 (2009) (con-
cluding that "[r]educed-calorie diets result in clinically meaningful weight loss re-
gardless of which macronutrients they emphasize").
19. ROBERTA LARSON DUYFF, AMERICAN DIETETIC ASSOCIATION COMPLETE FOOD
AND NUTRITION GUIDE 29 (2002).
20. Obviously, for nutritional reasons, such a diet would be a poor choice.
21. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Obesity and Overweight,
http://www. cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/overwt.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
22. Because BMI is derived solely from height and weight, some athletes or
bodybuilders may be misclassified as overweight even though they have low body
fat percentages. However, because only a small percentage of people fall within
these exceptions, the CDC's findings are still useful. For the general population,
there is a strong correlation between body fat and BMI. See Magnus Dencker et al.,
BMI and Objectively Measured Body Fat and Body Fat Distribution in Prepubertal Chil-
dren, 27 CLINICAL PHYSIOLOGY AND FUNCTIONAL IMAGING 12, 12-16 (2006) (conclud-
ing that "[p]ercentage body fat [was] closely associated with BMI, suggesting that
372010]
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Height Weight BMI Considered
5'9" 124 lbs or less Below 18.5 Underweight
5'9" 125 lbs to 168 lbs 18.5 to 24.9 Healthy weight
5'9" 169 lbs to 202 lbs 25.0 to 29.9 Overweight
5'9" 203 lbs or more 30 or higher Obese
The data show that thirty-four percent of Americans over age
twenty are obese and another thirty-three percent are overweight.4
Eighteen percent of adolescents and more than ten percent of chil-
dren are overweight.5 Another eight to nine percent of Americans
are underweight,"' and, incredibly, only one-quarter of Americans
are a healthy weight. More adults fall into the obese category than
any other classification. Today, obese people outnumber healthy
and underweight individuals combined, and the problem is only
getting worse. Thomas Frieden, the head of the CDC noted that
"[lthe average American is now 23 pounds overweight and collec-
tively we are 4.6 billion pounds overweight."2 In other words,
Americans have eaten sixteen trillion calories too many.
The National Center for Health Statistics found that between
1960 and 2006, the percentage of obese adults has nearly tripled."
BMI serves as a good surrogate marker for obesity in population studies"); See Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, About BMI for Adults,
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/ adult bmi/index.html ("BMI
does not measure body fat directly, but research has shown that BMI correlates to
direct measures of body fat .... ).
23. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and Obesity: Defin-
ing Overweight and Obesity, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/defining.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 12, 2010).
24. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 21.
25. Id.
26. Meghan A.T.B. Reese, Underweight: A Heavy Concern TODAY'S DIETITIAN Jan.
2006, at 56, available at http://www.todaysdietitian.com/newarchives/tdjan2008
pg56. shtml.
27. Thomas Frieden, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
CDC Weight of the Nation Press Briefing (July 27, 2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090727.htm.
28. Sixteen trillion calories is equivalent to nine billion Burger King Whopper
meals with large fries and a large soda. See Shereen Jegtvig, Burger King@ Whop-
per@ With Cheese, Large Fries and a Large Soda, http://nutrition.about.com/od/
rateameal/a/ whoppermeal.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
29. National Center for Health Statistics, Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, and
Extreme Obesity among Adults: United States, Trends 1960-62 through 2005-
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During this same period, the proportion of Americans who are "ex-
tremely obese" increased more than 600%."
This shift seems to indicate a fundamental change in caloric in-
take and expenditure." Indeed, over that time, the "calories in" and
"calories out" variables in the equation have shifted drastically.
Americans now eat more" and exercise less." In 1958, the average
American consumed less than 1900 calories per day." By 2007, that
number had grown to 2,775," more than 500 calories above the
USDA's Recommended Energy Allowance of 2,247."
If people needed these extra calories to supply energy for in-
creased physical activity, this trend would not be troubling. We can
return to the formula to see why. If the number of calories burned
2006, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/overweight/overweight-adult.htm
(noting an increase from 13.4% to 35.1%).
30. Id. (noting an increase from 0.9% to 6.2%).
31. See World Health Organization, Obesity and Overweight,
http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/facts/obesity/en (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010) ("The key causes [of obesity] are increased consumption of energy-
dense foods high in saturated fats and sugars, and reduced physical activity.").
32. For a graph charting the increase in caloric intake from 1970-2000, see Judy
Putnam, Jane Allshouse, & Linda Scott Kantor, U.S. Per Capita Food Supply Trends:
More Calories, Refined Carbohydrates, and Fats, 25 FooD REv. 2, 3, Winter 2002, avail-
able at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/FoodReview/DEC2002/fr-vol25i3.pdf.
33. Judy Putnam, U.S. Food Supply Providing More Food and Calories, 22 FOOD REV.
2, 2, Sep.-Dec. 1999, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ foodre-
view/sepl999/frsept99.pdf (noting that "[aill three major per capita food supply
measurements-food available for consumption, nutrients available for consump-
tion, and the food supply adjusted for spoilage and other losses in the home and
marketing system-suggest that Americans in the 1990's are consuming more food
and several hundred more calories per person per day than did their counterparts
in the late 1950's.").
34. See Dana E. King et al., Adherence to Healthy Lifestyle Habits in US Adults,
1988-2006, 122 AM. J. MED. 528, 530 (2009) ("The percent of adults aged 40-74
[engaged in] physical activity 12 times a month or more has decreased from 53% to
43%"). Incredibly, in gym class, children are active an average of 3.5 minutes.
KELLY D. BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATILE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT 78 (2004).
35. Putnam, supra note 33, at 2.
36. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE,
Loss-ADJUSTED FOOD AVAILABILITY DATA, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
data/foodconsumption/FoodGuideSpreadsheet.htm#caloies.
37. Linda Scott Kantor, Food and Rural Economics Division, Economic Re-
search Service, U.S. Dept. of Ag., Agricultural Economic Report No. 772, A DIETARY
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: COMPARING PER CAPITA FOOD CONSUMPTION
WITH FOOD GUIDE PYRAMID SERVING RECOMMENDATIONS (1998), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer772/aer772.pdf; see also MARION NESTLE,
FOOD POLITICS 8 (2002) (noting that "overeating [is] the most probable cause of
excessive weight gain").
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had increased alongside the number of calories consumed, the
equation would have remained in stasis, and obesity would not be a
problem. Unfortunately, the exact opposite has occurred. People
are now burning fewer calories and are less active than at any other
time in our history."
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found that, on an average
day, only sixteen percent of Americans participate in sports or exer-
cise activities.' In another study, the CDC determined that fifty-five
percent of adults do not meet the minimum level of recommended
exercise (thirty minutes of moderate activity five times per week)."o
Although this sounds like a lot of exercise, activities such as vacuum-
ing and gardening meet the CDC's requirements for "moderate ac-
tivity." Surprisingly, even under this lenient definition, twenty-six
percent of Americans fail to get any physical activity."
These statistics should trouble us because poor diet and physi-
cal inactivity cause 16.6% of all deaths in America." More specifi-
cally, twenty-three percent of the deaths from major chronic dis-
eases-such as stroke, heart disease, and diabetes-are caused by
Americans' sedentary lifestyle." Proper nutrition and exercise could
save 400,000 American lives every year."
The problems of obesity, however, are not confined to the over-
weight individuals themselves. Losing excess weight is not just
about looking and feeling better; there are also powerful economic
reasons to trim the fat. With obesity-related diseases costing the
medical system an additional $147 billion annually, obesity is now a
greater burden on the health care system than cigarettes or alco-
38. See World Health Organization, supra note 31 ("[L]arge shifts towards less
physically demanding work have been observed worldwide. Moves towards less
physical activity are also found in the increasing use of automated transport, tech-
nology in the home, and more passive leisure pursuits.").
39. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Spotlight on Statistics: Sports and Exercise,
May 2008, available at http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2008/sports/pdf/sports
bls-spotlight. pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
40. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Prevalence of Physical Activity,
Including Lifestyle Activities Among Adults-United States, 2000-2001, 52 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 764, 764-79, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5232a2.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
41. Id.
42. Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N. 1238, 1238 (2004).
43. Robert A. Hahn et al., Excess Deaths from Nine Chronic Diseases in the United
States, 1986, 264J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 2654, 2656 (1990).
44. See Mokdad, supra note 42, at 1240.
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hol." On average, an obese individual spends forty percent more on
health care than a normal-weight person." That amounts to an extra
$1500 per year for every overweight person. Approximately half of
that cost is born by Medicare and Medicaid." That means you, the
taxpayer, are subsidizing other people's bad decisions.
Although the most direct effects of obesity are felt by the health
care system, its problems are not limited to that sector. The entire
U.S. economy suffers due to decreased productivity. Annually, obe-
sity causes the loss of 39.3 million workdays. It is also responsible
for 239 million restricted-activity days, 89.5 million bed days, and
62.7 million physician visits." These direct economic effects check
in at $254 billion, nearly twice as high as the medical costs." In
comparison, smoking only reduces productivity by seventy-nine bil-
lion dollars.'
Curing the obesity problem would not only increase economic
output, it would also redirect current spending. Overweight drivers
burn an additional one billion gallons of gas each year." Airlines
would save another billion gallons of gas, and the industry would
actually become profitable once again. Clothing costs would be re-
duced by ten billion dollars, and food expenditures would decline
by the billions." Between the direct effects on the economy and
health care, obesity costs the nation $487 billion per year." Elimi-
nate all these expenses and each U.S. household would end the year
with an extra $4,270 in its checking account.'
45. Roland Sturm, The Effects of Obesity, Smoking and Drinking on Medical Problems
and Costs 21 HEALTH AFF. 245, 245 (2002).
46. Frieden, supra note 27.
47. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Obesity and Overweight: Eco-
nomic Consequences, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/causes/economics.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010).
48. Anne M. Wolf & Graham A. Colditz, Current Estimates of the Economic Cost of
Obesity in the United States, 6 OBESITY RES. 97 (1998).
49. Ross DeVol & Armen Bedroussian, An Unhealthy America: The Economic Bur-
den of Chronic Disease-Charting a New Course to Save Lives and Increase Productivity and
Economic Growth ii-iii (2007), available at http://www.milkeninstitute.
org/pdf/chronic diseasereport.pdf.
50. Id. at iii.
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Unfortunately, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Once reduced
longevity and quality of life are taken into consideration, the true
cost is incalculable." Being overweight reduces one's life-expectancy
by three years, and being obese reduces one's life-expectancy by 6.5
years.5 ' For comparison, smoking has a similar effect on longevity.57
Not only do overweight people die sooner, but also their quality of
life is lower.
If the problems from obesity are so serious and the formula to
shed those excess pounds is so simple, why are two-thirds of Ameri-
cans overweight? An insatiable sweet tooth is a major cause.
B. The Sugar Addiction
On the one hand, sugar" is delicious. On the other hand, sugar
causes premature aging,' diabetes, and heart disease, raises choles-
terol and blood pressure," suppresses the immune system," and
55. See David S. Ludwig & Harold A. Pollack, Obesity and the Economy: From Crisis
to Opportunity, 301 J. AM. MED. ASs'N. 533, 534 (noting that the economic and health
costs are "likely to be dwarfed by reasonable economic valuation of reduced longev-
ity and quality of life").
56. Anna Peeters et al., Obesity in Adulthood and its Consequences for Life Expec
tancy: A Life-Table Analysis, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 24, 28 (2003) (see table 3).
57. Id. at 24.
58. See Jennifer Klingemann et al., Relationship between Quality of Life and Weight
Loss 1 Year after Gastric Bypass, 26 DIGESTIVE SURGERY 430, 430 (concluding that a
reduction in BMI "dramatically" improves health-related quality of life); See Rebecca
M. Puhl, Perceptions of Weight Discrimination: Prevalence and Comparison to Race and
Gender Discrimination in America, 32 INT'L J. OBEsrry 992, 998 (finding that
"weight/height discrimination occurs in employment settings and daily interper-
sonal relationships virtually as often as race discrimination, and in some cases even
more frequently than age or gender discrimination").
59. Throughout the paper, sugar is used to denote the sugar that has been
added to foods, not the sugar that occurs naturally in fruits. This added sugar gen-
erally takes the form of sucrose (refined table sugar) and high-fructose corn syrup
(a mixture of fructose and glucose).
60. See Antoine E. Roux et al., Pro-Aging Effects of Glucose Signaling through a G
Protein-Coupled Glucose Receptor in Fission Yeast, PLOS GENETICS Mar. 2009 at 1 (not-
ing that "substantial evidence supports the idea that excess glucose acts as a pro-
aging and pathogenic factor").
61. Harry G. Preuss et al., Sugar-Induced Blood Pressure Elevations Over the Lifespan
of Three Substrains of Wistar Rats, 17 J. AM. C. NUTRITION 36, 38 (1998) (finding that
"rats ingesting diets high in sucrose . . . eventually showed statistically higher [sys-
tolic blood pressure] over their lifespan compared to those consuming the base-
line").
62. W. M. Ringsdorf et al., Neutrophilic Phagocytosis and Resistance to Disease, 52
DENTAL SURVEY 46, 46-48 (finding that drinking twenty-four ounces of cola de-
presses the activity of neutrophils, white blood cells that kill bacteria).
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contributes to obesity. The choice seems obvious, but for most
Americans, the short-term benefit of taste outweighs all of these
long-term negative effects.
It is quite obvious that Americans have a sweet tooth. The
USDA sets the maximum daily allowance of sugar at ten teaspoons,
less than the amount of sugar in a twelve-ounce can of Pepsi.' The
American Heart Association recommends even less: six teaspoons
for women and nine teaspoons for men. The average American far
exceeds both upper limits, consuming 22.2 teaspoons each day. In
2008, the USDA determined that, after adjusting for loss during
transport, processing, and uneaten food, per capita sugar consump-
tion was more than 85 pounds.' Each year, every person is eating
154,221 empty calories from sugar." That's more calories than the
average person eats in the first two months of the year.
Where is all this added sugar coming from? Soft drinks are by
far the biggest contributor, accounting for nearly thirty-three per-
cent of our sugar intake." The sheer amount of soda that we con-.
sume is staggering. On average, Americans drink fifty-two gallons of
soft drinks a year, and teenage girls get ten to fifteen percent of
their total caloric intake from these sugary beverages."
A large part of the remaining two-thirds of our sugar intake is,
of course, derived from the usual suspects: sweetened fruit drinks
(ten percent), candy (five percent), cake (five percent), cookies (four
percent), and cereal (four percent)."
63. Center for Science in the Public Interest, America: Drowning in Sugar, http://
www.cspinet.org/new/sugar.html (last visited April 11, 2010).
64. See USDA, Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook: Table 51-Refined cane and beet
sugar: estimated number of per capita calories consumed daily, by calendar year,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/data.htm (Per capita consumption is 46.8
pounds); see USDA, Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook: Table 52-High fructose corn
syrup: estimated number of per capita calories consumed daily, by calendar year,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/data.htm (Per capita consumption is 37.9
pounds).
65. There are four calories in every gram of sugar.
66. John Casey, The Hidden Ingredient that can Sabotage Your Diet,
http://www. medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=56589 (last visited
April 11, 2010); Rachel K. Johnson et al., Dietary Sugars Intake and Cardiovascular
Health: A Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association 120 CIRCULATION: J.
AM. HEART AsS'N. 1011, 1011 (2009) (noting that "[s]oft drinks and other sugar-
sweetened beverages are the primary source of added sugars in Americans' diets").
67. James E. Tillotson, Food Brands: Friend or Foe? NUTRITION TODAY, Mar.-Apr.
2002, at 78-79.
68. Casey, supra note 66.
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The rest tends to come from "hidden" sugar. Over the years,
manufacturers have become ever more creative, managing to hide
sugar in even seemingly healthy foods. Ketchup appears innocuous
enough, right? After all, it's made from tomatoes, one of the best
antioxidants." Well, ketchup producers have managed to squeeze a
full teaspoon of sugar into every tablespoon of ketchup.' Think
about that. One-third of the ketchup bottle is sugar.
Peanut butter is another food that seems healthy. After all, it is
filled with "good" mono- and polyunsaturated fats." Unfortunately,
many brands have also been loaded with sugar."
Ironically, low-fat foods that are marketed to health conscious
consumers are another favorite hiding place for sugar. When
manufacturers take out the fat, the product loses its great taste. To
compensate, producers add additional sugar. Although low-fat
snack foods tend to have fifty-nine percent less fat per serving than
their regular counterparts, the low-fat foods contain only fifteen
percent fewer calories."
At first glance, a fifteen percent reduction may still seem like a
positive step. However, people tend to eat larger quantities of low-
fat foods, more than offsetting any potential caloric savings.
In one study, researchers gave half the subjects a bowl of "low-
fat" granola. The remaining subjects were given a bowl of regular
granola. Although the granola in both bowls were identical, the sub-
jects who believed the granola were low-fat ate forty-eight percent
more.' The researchers concluded as follows:
If participants in [the study] had eaten real low fat granola, and if the
low fat granola had the average level of fat and calories for the category,
participants would have consumed 35% less fat from the low fat granola
69. See Jeanie Lerche Davis, The Tasty Tomato: An Antioxidant Power Blast, http://
www.webmd.com/food-recipes/features/tasty-tomato-antioxidant-power-blast (last
visited April 11, 2010) ("Tomatoes are loaded with health-protective antioxidants
such as lycopene, vitamin C, and vitamin A.").
70. See, Gayle A. Alleman, USDA Nutrition Guidelines, http://recipes.
howstuffworks.com/usda-nutrition-guidelines-ga9.htm (last visited April 11, 2010).
71. See Walter C. Willett, Ask the Doctor: Why is Peanut Butter "Healthy" if it has
Saturated Fat?, HARV. HEART LETTER July 2009, available at http://
www.health.harvard. edu/newsletters/HarvardHeartLetter/2009/July/Ask-the-
doctor-Why-is-peanut-butter-healthy-if-it-has-saturated-fat.
72. See The Daily Plate, Peanut Butter, http://www.thedailyplate.com/nutrition-
calories/food/jif/peanut-butter (last visited April 11, 2010) (noting that there are
three grams of sugar in every serving ofJif Peanut Butter).
73. Brian Wansink & Pierre Chandon, Can Low Fat Nutrition Labels Lead to Obe-
sity, 43J. MARKETING REs. 605, 609 (2006).
74. Id. at 611.
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but would have consumed 33% more total calories. This is a conserva-
tive estimate ... [T]he calorie increase would have probably been even
higher because the ingredients used to replace fat tend to make people
75
hungrier.
So, we have a situation where people think they are eating
fewer calories but are actually consuming thirty-three percent more.
If nothing else, one has to marvel at the brilliant marketing. The
food industry has managed to increase revenue by producing
"health" foods that are more unhealthy than their normal counter-
parts.
Although not surprising, it is disconcerting that corporations
choose to exploit consumer misbeliefs instead of working to correct
them. This action does raise an important question. If companies
are willing to take advantage of existing consumer ignorance, are
they also willing to actively create misperceptions in order to boost
profits? As the rest of this article will show, the answer is a resound-
ing yes. From tobacco to trans-fat to artificial sweeteners, the food
industry has been waging a war against science. Through backroom
political bargains, corporate America and the U.S. government are
trading your long-term health for short-term profits.
Returning to our earlier equation," we find that the average
American could lose nearly ten pounds a year just by cutting his
sugar consumption by a modest twenty-five percent. Keep in mind
that, even with this reduction, Americans would still far exceed the
USDA maximum daily allowance.
Such a weight loss would go far in alleviating many of the prob-
lems discussed in the previous section. Even if Americans compen-
sate by eating additional calories from other foods, it would still be a
beneficial dietary change.
This is true because sugar is full of "empty" calories," meaning
that it lacks vitamins, minerals, and fiber. These are the nutrients
that our bodies need to function properly. Due, in large part, to
excessive sugar consumption, most Americans are not getting suffi-
cient quantities of many essential nutrients. Sugar has the effect of
75. Id. at 614.
76. Calories divided by 3,500 equals change in weight. See Part LA for a detailed
explanation.
77. Roger W. Miller, Empty Calories; Putting on Pounds with Poor Nutrition, FDA
CONSUMER, Nov. 1986, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-ml370/
isv20/ ai_4531709.
78. See e.g., Adit A. Ginde et al., Demographic Differences and Trends of Vitamin D
Insufficiency in the US Population, 1988-2004, 169 ARcHIVES INTERNAL MED. 626, 631-
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crowding out more nutritious foods. As an example, consider the
following: "Over the last 16 years, the percent of adults aged 40-74
... [who eat] 5 or more fruits and vegetables a day has decreased
from 42% to 26%.""7 During the same time, sugar consumption has
increased significantly.
Given all the harmful effects of sugar and its close association
with obesity, it is not surprising that health-conscious Americans are
looking elsewhere to satisfy their sweet cravings.
II. ARTIFICIAL SWEETENERS AND STEVIA
Non-caloric and hundreds of times sweeter than sugar, artificial
sweeteners seemed like a godsend, both for America's sweet tooth
and its waistline. Unfortunately, these products did not live up to
their promises.
First, artificial sweeteners lack the magical weight loss proper-
ties many people associate with them. In fact, they may actually
cause weight gain." It turns out our bodies have a natural ability to
count calories based on the sweetness of foods. Artificial sweeteners
disrupt that mechanism by tricking our brains into thinking sweet
foods have fewer calories. In turn, people overindulge when they
eat sweet products, further aggravating the obesity epidemic dis-
cussed in the prior sections.
Setting this indirect problem aside, artificial sweeteners are
harmful in their own right. Ironically, in a quest to eat healthier
foods, the public has embraced even less healthy alternatives. There
are currently five FDA-approved artificial sweeteners: saccharin, as-
partame, acesulfame potassium, sucralose, and neotame. This paper
will focus on the most popular ones: saccharin, aspartame, and su-
cralose. The first three sections will document the suspicious cir-
cumstances surrounding each additive's approval and examine what
independent studies actually concluded about these sweeteners.
The fourth section will contrast these products with stevia, a safe,
natural, non-caloric sweetener. Stevia's lengthy approval history will
show that corporations manipulate the FDA to increase their own
profits. In the end, regardless of one's thoughts on the merits of
32 (finding that only one in four Americans gets an adequate amount of Vitamin
D).
79. King, supra note 34, at 530.
80. See T.L. Davidson & S.E. Swithers, A Pavlovian Approach to the Problem of Obe-
sity, 28 INT'L.J. OBESITY & RELATED METABOLIC DIsoRDERS 933, 934-35 (2004).
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these sweeteners, the FDA approval process will be cause for con-
cern.
A. Saccharin
In 1879, two researchers at Johns Hopkins University discov-
ered saccharin, the world's first artificial sweetener." Although the
scientists realized saccharin's commercial potential early on, the
product was not marketed in the United States until 1901. Due to
the chemical's intense sweetness,"2 it soon became popular. The
sweetener also stirred up controversy.
In 1907, the USDA launched an investigation to determine
whether saccharin was safe. Fearing that the USDA would ban the
sweetener, future vice president James Sherman met with President
Theodore Roosevelt on behalf of a New York food manufacturing
firm. Sherman told the President how the sweetener had saved his
company thousands of dollars in production costs. Harvey Wiley,
the first commissioner of the FDA," also happened to be at this
meeting. He was extremely concerned about the dangers of saccha-
rin consumption and warned President Roosevelt that "[e]veryone
who ate that sweet corn was deceived. He thought he was eating
sugar, when in point of fact he was eating a coal tar product totally
devoid of food value and extremely injurious to health." Roosevelt
angrily responded, "Anybody who says saccharin is injurious to
health is an idiot.""
Nevertheless, to placate Wiley, the President appointed a Refe-
ree Board of Consulting Scientific Experts to reexamine saccharin's
safety. Since the head of the Board was Ira Remsen, one of the
Johns Hopkins researchers who discovered the sweetener, the out-
come was predetermined." From the beginning, big business had
managed to intervene and prevent the government from seriously
reviewing saccharin's health risks.
81. Victoria Gilman, Artificial Sweeteners, 82 Sci. & TECH. 43, 43. (2004).
82. Depending on how saccharin is used, it is between 200 and 700 times
sweeter than sugar. See SUGAR ASS'N, ARTIFICIAL SWEETENERS, http://www.sugar.
org/consumers/sweet-by nature.asp?id=283 (last visited April 2, 2010).
83. At the time, the agency was known as the Bureau of Chemistry.
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A few years later, World War I sugar shortages created addi-
tional demand for saccharin, and with the health concerns forgot-
ten, the artificial sweetener market expanded for half a century.
Then, in 1972, the safety controversy was reignited.
That year, saccharin came directly under attack when two stud-
ies linked consumption of the sweetener with cancer in lab animals.
Although the Delaney Clause now required the FDA to ban saccha-
rin, commissioner Charles Edwards refused to act. In 1977, yet an-
other study linked saccharin to bladder tumors in rats," and within a
few years, the carcinogenicity of saccharin was reaffirmed by addi-
tional trials."
Within months, Canada instituted a ban on saccharin that is still
in effect today.o The FDA, now under the leadership of a new
commissioner, also proposed a ban. However, fearing large finan-
cial losses," the U.S. sweetener industry immediately mounted a
campaign to save saccharin. Industry pressure prevailed, and Con-
gress passed the Saccharin Study and Labeling Act which forbade
the FDA from banning the sweetener for 18 months." This short-
term prohibition has since been extended numerous times,' pre-
venting the FDA from regulating saccharin up until the present day.
Although Congress ultimately preempted any saccharin ban,
one must wonder why the FDA failed to act sooner. It was not until
87. PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 923 (2d ed. 1991).
88. 42 FED. REG. 19996, 19999 (proposed April 15, 1977)
89. See R.A. Squire, Histopatholocial Evaluation of Rat Urinary Bladders from the
IRDC Two-Generation Bioassay of Sodium Saccharin, 23 FOOD & CHEM. Toxic. 491,
493-496 (1985); J.M. Taylor et al, Chronic Toxicity and Carcinogenicity to the Urinary
Bladder of Sodium Saccharin in the In Utero-Exposed Rat, 54 Toxic. & APPLIED PHARMA.
57, 74 (1980) (reaffirming that saccharin causes an increase in bladder neoplasia
and hyperplasia in rats).
90. See Robert Trumbull, Canada's Saccharin Ban Leaves a Bitter Taste, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 1978, at F3.
91. See id. (In Canada, "[flinancial losses to food and beverage concerns have
been heavy. The head of one major Canadian concern involved in the saccharin
trade said his company had lost two-thirds of its sales. The production chief of
another hard-hit company called the costs converting to different food lines crip-
pling.").
92. See The Great Saccharin Snafu, CONSUMER REPORTS, July 1977, at 410, 410-14.
93. Pub. L. No. 95-203, § 1, 3; 91 Stat. 1451, 1452 (1977).
94. See Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509(b), 93 Stat. 695 (1979); Pub. L. No. 96-273, 94
Stat. 536 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-42, § 2, 95 Stat. 946 (1981); Pub. L. No. 98-22, § 2,
97 Stat. 173 (1983); Pub. L. No. 99-46, 99 Stat. 81 (1985); Pub. L. No. 100-71, § 101,
101 Stat. 431 (1987); Pub. L. No. 102-142, 105 Stat. 910 (1991); Pub. L. No. 104-180,
§ 602, 110 Stat. 1594 (1996).
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five years after studies began showing saccharin's carcinogenic
properties that the FDA seriously contemplated doing something.
When discussing his failure to regulate the sweetener, Commis-
sioner Charles Edwards explained, "American consumers demand
the availability of diet food products. It is irrelevant whether these
diet products produce quantifiable health benefits or whether con-
sumers simply like them . . . . [Saccharin] has come to be accepted
and expected by the American public, and any law which does not
recognize this simply will not work."'
At its most basic level, this is appealing. Let the American peo-
ple determine what additives they want to consume. However, Ed-
wards's position breaks down for several reasons. First, by claiming
that he deferred to majority rule, Edwards actually undermined ma-
jority rule. Because it is impossible for Americans to evaluate the
safety of every potential product, they have assigned this task to the
FDA. The public essentially views the FDA as "the mechanism
through which the government attempts to compel corporations to
act responsibly, and to not damage our health . . . ."' By allowing
saccharin to remain on the market, the FDA is implicitly stating that
the sweetener is not a health risk. This seal of approval allows con-
sumers to discount research that provides evidence of saccharin's
dangers. Regardless of the FDA's true motives for not banning the
sweetener, the fact that it is on the market is a powerful signal of
safety.
Second, and more importantly, if the FDA actually wants to re-
spect consumer preferences, it is doing a terrible job. The agency
consistently bans safe, natural substances only to turn around and
legalize prescription drugs that are nothing more than patented
knock-offs.
One of the most egregious examples involves lovastatin and red
yeast rice. When the pharmaceutical industry isolated lovastatin, a
cholesterol lowering drug, the market potential seemed enormous.
There was just one problem. Red yeast rice, a product that had
been in the food supply for more than two thousand years," con-
tained monacolin K, a naturally occurring compound identical to
95. Oversight of Food Safety, 1983: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983) (statement of Charles Ed-
wards).
96. See MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 232.
97. Ozlem Erdo rul & Sebile Azirak, Review of the Studies on the Red Yeast Rice, 2
TURKISH ELECTRONICJ. BIOTECH. 37, 38 (2004).
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lovastatin." Because red yeast rice could not be patented, supple-
ments derived from it would severely hamper sales of lovastatin.
Big Pharma brought this problem to the FDA, and the agency
set about finding a solution. The FDA ultimately determined that
because red yeast rice contains a substance identical to a drug, it can
be regulated as a drug. Essentially, the FDA allowed pharmaceutical
companies to patent a substance in red yeast rice. The agency then
turned around and banned red yeast rice for containing that pat-
ented compound. It is simply incredible that the FDA can redefine
a natural substance as a drug and then subsequently ban any natural
products that contain the "drug." This would be no different if a
pharmaceutical company had patented vitamin C, and the FDA had
then banned oranges because they naturally contain vitamin C.
The FDA has proven time and again that it is willing to ban safe
products if it will increase the profits of pharmaceutical companies.
Some additional examples include L-tryptophan," pyridoxamine
(vitamin B6),'00 ephedra,o' estriol," and even information regarding
the health benefits of cherries.'o One second the FDA proclaims
98. Mayo Clinic, Red Yeast Rice (Monascus Purpureus), http://
www.mayoclinic.com/health/red-yeast-rice/NS-patient-redyeast (last visited Apr. 9,
2010).
99. The FDA banned L-tryptophan but allowed the substance to be used in pre-
scription drugs. This caused the effective price of tryptophan to increase by 500%.
The ban was eventually lifted after more than a decade of vocal opposition from
consumers and organizations such as the Mayo Clinic. See Dean Wolfe Manders,
The FDA Ban of L-Tryptophan: Politics, Profits and Prozac, 26 SOc. POL'Y. 55, 55-58
(1995).
100. See American Association for Health Freedom, When is a Vitamin Not a
Vitamin? When the FDA Says So!, http://aahf.nonprofitsoapbox.com/
index.php?option= comcontent&task=view&id=677&ltemid (last visited Feb. 26,
2010).
101. See Mike Adams, FDA Declares Form of Vitamin B6 a Drug Effectively Banning
Pyridoxamine from Dietary Supplements, http://www.naturalnews.com/025606.html
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010) ("The same thing happened with ephedra, a Traditional
Chinese Medicine herb known as ma huang. The FDA banned the herb, saying it
was 'dangerous at any dose,' but pharmaceuticals containing the very same mole-
cules (ephedrine) are still being sold over-the-counter as cold medicines, meaning
they're available to any child without a prescription.").
102. See American Association for Health Freedom, Natural Substance Knock Offs
in the FDA Pipeline Could be Dangerous, Sep. 6, 2008, http://
foodconsumer.org/7777/8888/C-onsumer A-ffair_26/090606512008_NaturalSub-
stanceKnockOffsin theFDAPipeline Could beDangerous.shtml.
103. See American Association for Health Freedom, Big Pharma and the FDA: Sup-
press the Science, Ban the Natural Substances, Sell the Drugs, http://www. organiccon-
sumers.org/articles/article18219.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) ("When the 2005
ban was instituted, the FDA sent warning letters to twenty-nine companies that
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that a natural substance is dangerous, despite independent scientific
consensus to the contrary. The very next moment, it determines
that a prescription drug derived from that same substance is per-
fectly safe.'" The Article will further explore the FDA's double
standard with respect to the natural sweetener stevia in Part II.D.
The agency's past actions have led to a worrisome process: base
approval decisions on consumer preferences when doing so en-
riches big business, and base approval decisions on food safety when
doing so enriches big business. This shadowy practice does make
one thing very clear. The FDA is broken."os The following sections
will make it even more apparent that the agency must be reformed.
B. Aspartame
Consumed by over two hundred million people and used in
more than six thousand products, aspartame is the king of artificial
sweeteners." In the U.S., it is marketed under the brand names
NutraSweet and Equal. Aspartame is found in everything from diet
sodas and sugar-free desserts to children's vitaminso and vegetable
juice." At one point, it accounted for sixty-two percent of the world
artificial sweetener market.o' Americans alone ingest more than
8,000 tons of aspartame each year." That statistic is even more in-
market cherry products. In these letters, they ordered the companies to stop publi-
cizing scientific data about cherries. According to the FDA, when cherry companies
disseminate this peer-reviewed scientific information, the cherries become 'unap-
proved new drugs' and are subject to seizure. The FDA warned that if those in-
volved in 'cherry trafficking' continue to inform consumers about these scientific
studies, criminal prosecutions would ensue.").
104. See Adams, supra note 101 (noting that "another classic oppression tactic of
the FDA [is to] [b]an the herb, but promote the drug using the same chemicals").
105. See, e.g., American Association for Health Freedom, supra note 102 (arguing
that, if you pay off the FDA, "the Agency will try to reward you with monopoly
control of the market").
106. Aspartame Information Center, Products, http://www.aspartame.org/as-
partame products.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
107. See, e.g., Bayer, Flintstones FAQs, http://flintstonesvitamins.com/faqs (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010) (stating that "the Flintstones Complete formula and Plus Cal-
cium formula contain aspartame").
108. For a partial list of products containing aspartame, see Aspartame Informa-
tion Center, supra note 106.
109. James Fry, The World Market for Intense Sweeteners, 85 WORLD REV. NUTRITION
& DIETETICS 201, 204 (1999).
110. United States National Library of Medicine, Hazardous Substances Data
Bank: Aspartame, http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-bin/sis/htmlgen?HSDB (search
for "aspartame") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
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credible when one considers that aspartame is 200 times sweeter
than table sugar."' This sweetener has become so pervasive that it is
almost impossible to find certain consumer products without it.' 2
In addition to being the most prominent artificial sweetener in
the world, aspartame also has the distinction of receiving more
complaints than any other substance in FDA history."'3  By 1992,
Americans had filed more than ten thousand aspartame-related
complaints, and approximately eighty percent of all non-drug com-
plaints to the FDA involved the sweetener."' People complained
that aspartame caused, among other side effects, headaches, rashes,
dizziness, menstrual problems, and seizures." Unfortunately, be-
cause the FDA stopped tracking aspartame complaints in 1992, the
current number of aspartame-related problems is unavailable."'
Nevertheless, the danger is still present. The following sections will
examine the evidence regarding aspartame's safety and the unset-
tling circumstances surrounding its approval.
1. The Evidence
In the course of writing Aspartame Disease: An Ignored Epidemic,
the author clinically observed 1200 patients who had suffered aspar-
tame reactions. He found that common side effects include vision
problems, tinnitus, headaches, memory loss, depression, heart palpi-
tations, diarrhea, itching, and severe joint pain."' Additional studies
have reinforced these observations, strengthening the link between
aspartame and depression,"' headaches,"' and seizures. Other case
111. Sugar Association, supra note 82.
112. Nearly every brand of chewing gum has aspartame. Even gum that contains
sugar is now supplemented with the artificial sweetener. See e.g., Wrigley, Double-
mint, http://www.wrigley.com/global/brands/ doublemint.aspx (last visited Apr.
9, 2010) (indicating that regular Doublemint gum now includes sugar, aspartame,
and acesulfame K).
113. Aspartame earned this honor in just three short years. See Janet Starr Hull,
How Many Aspartame Complaints are Registered with the FDA?, Oct. 7, 2005,
http://wwwjanethull.com/askdrhull/article.php?id=044.
114. Id.
115. 131 CONG. REC. 9981, 10807 (1985).
116. See Janet Starr Hull, Is it True that the Majority of FDA Complaints are for Aspar-
tame?, Oct. 7, 2005, http://wwwjanethull.com/askdrhull/article.php?id=043 (The
FDA "began putting the complaints into generic categories not related to aspar-
tame, such as death. If death by seizure was reported as a reaction to aspartame,
the death was recorded as seizure only and not as an 'aspartame' seizure.").
117. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 68-71.
118. See Ralph G. Walton et al., Adverse Reactions to Aspartame: Double-blind Chal-
lenge in Patients from a Vulnerable Population, 34 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 13, 13
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studies have also connected aspartame to "angry outbursts",'' skin
lesions," and panic attacks.'" Aspartame has even been linked to
cancer.' The FDA complaints present a similarly stark picture.'
Given all of these dangerous side effects, how could the FDA
have ever approved this artificial sweetener? Well, it turns out that
there is also evidence supporting aspartame's safety. Funding for
the trials providing this "evidence," however, came from the Nu-
traSweet industry. A survey of aspartame research found that "[o]f
the 166 studies felt to have relevance for questions of human safety,
74 had NutraSweet industry related funding and 92 were independ-
ently funded. One hundred percent of the industry funded research
attested to aspartame's safety, whereas 92 percent of the independ-
ently funded research identified a problem."'2 6
These numbers actually understate the unanimity of independ-
ent scientific opinion. Of the seven non-industry funded studies
that were favorable to aspartame, one was a literature review that
focused on industry research, and six were conducted by the FDA.'2 7
Due to the FDA's pro-business bias and controversial ties to G.D.
(1993) (concluding "that individuals with mood disorders are particularly sensitive
to this artificial sweetener and its use in this population should be discouraged").
119. See e.g., Stephen K. Van Den Eeden et al., Aspartame Ingestion and Headaches:
A Randomized Crossover Trial, 44 NEUROLOGY 1787, 1787 (1994) ("Subjects reported
headaches on 33% of the days during aspartame treatment. . . ." The paper con-
cluded "that some people are particularly susceptible to headaches caused by aspar-
tame and may want to limit their consumption."); see e.g., Rebecca B. Lipton et al.,
Aspartame as a Dietary Trigger of Headache, 29 HEADACHE 90, 90 ("[A]spartame may
be an important dietary trigger of headache in some people.").
120. See T.J. Maher & R.J. Wurtman, Possible Neurologic Effects of Aspartame, a
Widely Used Food Additive, 75 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 53, 56 (1987).
121. See 131 CONG. REc. 10,805-6 (1985).
122. See Nelson Lee Novick, Aspartame-Induced Granulomatous Panniculitis, 102
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 206, 206-7 (1985).
123. SeeJ.M. Ferguson, Panic Attacks and Excessive Aspartame Ingestion, 328 LANCET
631, 631 (1986).
124. See John Olney et al., Increasing Brain Tumor Rates: Is There a Link to Aspar-
tame?, 55 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 1115, 1115-23 (1996)
(concluding that "there is need for reassessing the carcinogenic potential of aspar-
tame"); see generally Morando Soffritti et al., First Experimental Demonstration of the
Multipotential Carcinogenic Effects of Aspartame Administered in the Feed to Sprague-
Dawley Rats, 114 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 379, 379-85 (2006).
125. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 72.
126. Ralph G. Walton, Survey of Aspartame Studies: Correlation of Outcome and
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Searle, the maker of aspartame, the independence of these six stud-
ies is questionable.'"
Moreover, thirty-three of the industry funded studies were, with
minor changes, published in different journals from two to six times
each.'" Repeatedly publishing the same study in multiple journals is
a deceptive and unethical practice commonly employed by pharma-
ceutical companies.'" It seems that Searle was more interested in
swamping the media with pro-aspartame studies than in actually as-
certaining the safety of a product that could harm millions of peo-
ple.''
Aspartame producers routinely state that the sweetener is the
most tested food additive ever approved by the FDA. However, this
wonderful marketing line hides the fact that a single valid study is
more useful than any number of flawed studies. Because Searle
could not boast of the quality of its studies, the company relied on
sheer quantity. The experiments were so poorly run that Alexander
Schmidt, the FDA commissioner at the time Searle submitted its
research, called the studies "incredibly sloppy science," adding that
"[w]hat was discovered was reprehensible."'2
Two of the most extensive trials on aspartame were run by a
group of Italian researchers.' 2  Unlike the Searle safety tests, their
studies were both independently funded and published in peer-
reviewed journals, the gold standard in science. The scientists were
motivated to perform their first "mega-experiment" because Searle's
studies "did not comply with today's basic requirements for testing
the carcinogenic potential of a physical or chemical agent."'" In
particular, the scientists noted that Searle's experiments were termi-
128. See infra Part II.B.2.
129. Walton, supra note 126 (indicating that "[v]irtually all journals require that
an affidavit be signed by all authors to the effect that neither the manuscript nor
the data it contains have been previously published or concurrently submitted else-
where for publication. Violation of this policy may have a detrimental impact on
scientific progress and ethics.").
130. See MIcHAEIs, supra note 12, at 149.
131. Many industries have employed a similar strategy. See supra notes 13-16 and
accompanying text.
132. 131 CONG. REc. 10,808 (1985).
133. See Soffritti supra note 124; Morando Soffritti et al., Life-Span Exposure to Low
Doses of Aspartame Beginning during Prenatal Life Increases Cancer Effects in Rats, 115
ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1293, 1293 (2007).
134. Soffritti, supra note 124 at 380.
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nated prematurely and failed to include a large enough population
sample.'1"
A major purpose of this study was to determine a safe accept-
able daily intake (ADI) for aspartame. On the basis of Searle's trials,
the FDA set the ADI at 50 mg/kg of bodyweight." In more con-
crete terms, a 150-pound adult would need to drink twenty cans of
diet soda to reach this limit.'3 7 The makers of aspartame went even
further, claiming that not even this high amount would be danger-
ous because the ADI has a "built-in safety factor."'3 8
Since most people do not consume that much aspartame, Sof-
fritti and his group of researchers sought to determine if aspartame
is a carcinogen when ingested in smaller quantities. Their study
showed that aspartame's "carcinogenic effects are evident even at a
daily dose of 20 mg/kg of bodyweight."'"
This is the equivalent of eight cans of diet soda, a limit many
Americans exceed."o Because aspartame is found in over 6,000
products, it is easy to see how a person can quickly surpass this level.
Nonetheless, aspartame proponents are likely to claim that this is a
relatively high limit, so it is still safe to ingest a lesser amount of as-
partame on a daily basis.
However, just because most people drink less does not mean
they are safe from the harmful effects. Recall that the FDA set the
ADI at fifty mg/kg of bodyweight. Soffritti's team of researchers
showed that aspartame is carcinogenic at a mere forty percent of the
FDA's supposedly safe level. Future research at lower quantities is
necessary, but the outcome for aspartame looks bleak.
To see why, it is perhaps easiest to draw an analogue to smok-
ing. Adhering to the previous ratios, the FDA has, in effect, claimed
that smoking five packs of cigarettes a day is safe. Soffritti's study
showed that not even two packs a day would be safe. Although we
135. Id. FDA statistician Robert J. Condon expressed similar concerns, finding
problems in the conduct and power of the studies. 131 CONG. REc. 10,807 (1985).
Satya D. Dubey, a statististician at the FDA's Center for Drugs and Biologics also
noted "certain statistical difficulties" with Searle's studies. Id.
136. The NutraSweet Company, How much aspartame do people actually con-




139. Soffritti supra note 124, at 384.
140. Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast May 19, 2007), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/weekend/story?Id=3191903&page=1.
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would certainly want to explore whether smoking fewer cigarettes
would cause cancer, even pack-a-day smokers should be worried.
The equivalent holds true for aspartame. The FDA has set a
high ADI of twenty cans of diet soda for the average adult. Scien-
tists undercut this number by showing that consuming a more plau-
sible eight cans of diet soda increases the likelihood of cancer. At
this point, even people who only drink a few cans of diet soda a
week may want to consider whether it is worth the health risk.
The same group of researchers conducted an additional ex-
periment that confirmed the first study and further determined that,
when pregnant rats eat aspartame, there is an increased incidence of
cancer among their offspring."'
Unhappy with these results, the aspartame industry went on the
offensive by funding a literature review that attacked the Soffritti
studies."' This particular piece was sponsored by Ajinomoto, a
Japanese supplier of aspartame. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the authors of the review accepted industry-research as gospel and
discounted any independently-funded research that showed evi-
dence of aspartame's dangers. Interestingly, after this review con-
cluded that the sweetener's "safety is clearly documented," Ajino-
moto rebranded aspartame as AminoSweet. The company did this
to hide aspartame's history of causing health problems and to trick
the public into thinking it is a natural product."'
Given all of this evidence, one cannot help but wonder how as-
partame has remained on the market for nearly thirty years. The
FDA's close relationship with G.D. Searle will resolve this mystery.
Unfortunately, the FDA-the very agency established to protect
Americans from unsafe food and drugs-placed corporate earnings
above our health.
2. FDA Approval
G.D. Searle, the creator of aspartame, has an extensive history
of manipulating reports to hide the dangers of its drugs. Between
141. See Life-Span Exposure, supra note 133, at 1297 (demonstrating that "when
life-span exposure to APM [aspartame] begins during fetal life, its carcinogenic
effects are increased").
142. B.A. Magnuson et al., Aspartame: A Safety Evaluation Based on Current Use
Levels, Regulations, and Toxicological and Epidemiological Studies, 37 CRITICAL REV.
TOXICOLOGY 629, 669 (2007).
143. See Ethan Huff, Aspartame Has Been Renamed and is Now Being Marketed
as a Natural Sweetener, http://www.naturalnews.com/028151_aspartame
sweeteners.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
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1975 and 1977 alone, the FDA investigated Searle for fraud involv-
ing the safety testing of Aldactone, Flagyl, Norpace, and aspar-
tame.' The FDA reported its findings to the Subcommittee on
Health of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and what they found was
startling. In some of the Aldactone studies, gross legions requiring
histopathological examinations were never examined, malignant
tumors were removed and never reported, and a full thirty percent
of the animal tissues earmarked for examination were never exam-
ined."' FDA commissioner Alexander Schmidt noted one study was
so bad that even "after three separate reviews by Searle personnel of
the same data . .. we are continuing to discover errors that compli-
cate review of this study."'4 6
Searle used even more dubious practices while preparing re-
ports for its other drugs. In the clinical trials for Flagyl, Searle often
had two pathologists examine the animals. When the pathologists'
opinions differed, Searle used the reports that cast Flagyl in the
more favorable light,"' and any data that questioned Flagyl's safety
was conveniently withheld from the FDA. Searle went even further
in its quest to approve aspartame. When pathologists submitted
unfavorable reports, Searle simply changed the findings.4 1
In a study of the drug Norpace, the FDA found "inadequate
ante-mortem observations: e.g. animals reported in good condition
were actually dead . . . .""' Searle's data are so contradictory that
individual rats die and come back to life as many as four times.
When manipulating data wasn't enough, Searle forced its scientists
to lie. Despite voicing his objections, John W. Sargatz, Searle's prin-
cipal pathologist, was ordered to write "reassuring comments on
post-mortems of rats .... "
This pattern of serious errors led the FDA to question the valid-
ity of all of Searle's studies. The agency noted that "the cumulative
findings of problems within and across the studies we investigated
144. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 75-
78 (1984).
145. Id. at 76.
146. Id.
147. Id. In a 1976 report to the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt criticized Searle for this prac-
tice.
148. Id. at 77 (Commissioner Schmidt noted that FDA "investigators found that a
pathologist's summary was edited in such a manner as to alter, generally in a favor-
able direction, some of the pathologist's findings.").
149. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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reveal a pattern of conduct which compromises the scientific integ-
rity of the studies."'"
Due to Searle's actions regarding Aldactone, Flagyl and Nor-
pace, the FDA General-Counsel's office wanted the government to
launch a criminal investigation. However, the Justice Department
decided that a criminal prosecution would be useless because senior
executives would pass the blame to a handful of junior managers.
Searle handled the aspartame approval process in a similarly
deceptive manner. In 1980, the FDA had two separate panels evalu-
ate aspartame. Both panels recommended not approving the sweet-
ener due to concerns about brain tumors.'5 ' The FDA task forces
determined that the Searle experiments were seriously flawed.'5
Raw data were missing, and the information that was available con-
tained numerous errors and discrepancies. The Searle's researchers
had disposed of dead rats without checking to see if aspartame
killed them and had operated on others to remove evidence of tu-
mors." The scientists even secretly administered antibiotics.'
Searle's scientists also failed to properly mix aspartame with the lab
animals' food. This allowed the rats to eat around the chemical. It's
pretty hard to find aspartame-related side effects when the rats
aren't even ingesting the aspartame.
The tactics uncovered in the FDA reports show that Searle mis-
represented the carcinogenic effects of aspartame and hid incrimi-
nating data from the agency.' Adrian Gross, a lead researcher on
the FDA task force, noted the following: "At the heart of FDA's
regulatory process is its ability to rely upon the basic safety data
submitted by sponsors of regulated products. Our investigation
clearly demonstrates that, in the G. D. Searle Co., we have no basis
for such reliance now."'5  Gross went on to state that, ironically,
150. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
151. See 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Dec. 29, 1996), available at
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5805190307148690
8 3 0#.
152. See FDA, The "Bressler Report", available at http://www.dorway.com/
bressler.txt.
153. See 60 Minutes, supra note 151.
154. Id.
155. Id. (The FDA investigation revealed "a pattern of conduct which compro-
mises the scientific integrity of the studies." Former Senator Howard Metzenbaum,
an active opponent of aspartame, said that "according to the FDA themselves,
Searle, in making their presentation to the FDA, had willfully misrepresented the
facts and had withheld some of the facts that they knew would possibly jeopardize
the approval of the product.").
156. Morton Mintz, Metzenbaum: NutraSweet Inquiry Needed, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
1986, at B9.
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Searle's own studies "established beyond a reasonable doubt that
aspartame is capable of inducing brain tumors in experimental ani-
mals." 15
FDA officials were so upset by Searle's deception that they sent
the file to the U.S. Attorney's office and urged them to present the
information to a grand jury. Unfortunately, it was never presented.
Samuel Skinner, the head of the grand jury probe, withdrew from
the case to accept a position at Searle's Chicago law firm Sidley &
Austin. During this delay, the statute of limitations ran out.'
Skinner was not the only government official tainted by Searle.
After leaving the FDA, former Acting Commissioner Michael
Friedman was hired as vice president of G.D. Searle. Unsurpris-
ingly, Friedman defended aspartame by arguing that despite the
numerous problems, "the scientists looking at that information de-
cided that the basic strength of the conclusions remains intact."'
Apparently, Friedman failed to read any of the FDA task force's re-
ports that directly contradict this statement.
The most striking corruption, however, involves FDA Commis-
sioner Arthur Hayes, Jr. and Donald Rumsfeld. Between 1977 and
1985, Donald Rumsfeld served as CEO, President, and eventually
Chairman of Searle. On January 21, 1981, a mere day after Presi-
dent Reagan's inauguration, Searle resubmitted its aspartame appli-
cation to the FDA. Hayes quickly appointed a five-member commit-
tee to determine whether aspartame should be approved. When it
became apparent that the committee would reject the application by
a vote of three to two, Hayes installed a sixth member. This tied the
vote and allowed Hayes, as FDA Commissioner, to break the dead-
lock and approve aspartame. Shortly after this incident, Hayes left
the FDA to take a job at Bursen-Marsteller, Searle's public relations
firm.'" Even if one fervently believes that aspartame is safe, this un-
derhanded process by which it was approved should be unsettling.
. C. Sucralose
If aspartame is the king of artificial sweeteners, sucralose is the
upstart prince making a grab for the crown. Since receiving FDA
approval in 1999, sucralose has become the most popular artificial
sweetener in the United States and aspartame's main rival in the
157. Id.
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global market. Sucralose is marketed by McNeil Nutritionals.' un-
der the brand name Splenda. It is currently used in more than
4,000 products and is 600 times sweeter than sugar.' Sucralose's
main advantage over aspartame is that it remains stable at high tem-
peratures.'" This property allows the sweetener to be used in baked
goods. Because sucralose can be added to a much wider variety of
products, people will have more opportunities to consume it.
Therefore, it is even more important to ensure that the sweetener is
safe.
Sucralose's problems start with its name. The similarity to su-
crose is not a coincidence. McNeil wants the public to think that
sucralose is a natural product.'" Even before approval, consumer
advocacy groups alerted the FDA that the name sucralose would
create confusion. They suggested that the product be labeled in a
manner that would accurately describe its chemical structure." The
FDA rejected this idea because other artificial sweeteners had not
been named according to this convention.'" The FDA made the
absurd argument that because people had not confused aspartame
with sucrose, they would not confuse sucralose with sucrose.
McNeil won this round, but in its quest to fool the public, the
company thought that similar names would not be enough. It also
developed slogans that would force consumers to mentally align
sugar with sucralose. One example is "Think sugar, say Splenda."'6 7
Another successful approach was to substitute "Splenda" for "sugar"
in childhood fairy tales. This led to such memorable advertisements
161. McNeil Nutritionals is a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. Linkedin, McNeil
Nutritionals, http://www.linkedin.com/companies/mcneil-nutritionels (last visited
Apr. 6, 2010).
162. Tate & Lyle, About SPLENDA@ Sucralose, http://www.tateandlyle.com/
TateAndLyle/products-applications/_products/sucralose/default.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2010).
163. Id. ("SPLENDA@ Sucralose retains its sweetness through all commonly used
food and beverage manufacturing processes and also throughout the shelf life of
finished products.").
164. McNeil Nutritionals' deceptive marketing has tricked forty-seven percent of
Splenda users into thinking that it is a natural product. Center for Science in the
Public Interest, "Splenda Should Stop Confusing Consumers, Says CSPI: Statement
of CSPI Executive Director Michael F. Jacobson," Feb. 14, 2005
http://www.cspinet.org/new/200502141.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
165. Sucralose's chemical name is trichlorogalactose.
166. FDA Final Rule on Sucralose, §102.5(a), http-//vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~1rd/
fr980403.html.
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as "The Dance of the Splenda Plum Fairy," "Splenda and Spice and
Everything Nice," and "Roses are Red, Violets are Blue, Splenda is
Sweet and So Are You."1'
Rival Merisant, the maker of aspartame-based Equal, felt that
these marketing techniques had gone too far. In 2006, the company
sued McNeil Nutritional for unfair profits and lost sales due to these
misleading advertisements.'" After it became clear that the jury
would find against McNeil, the two companies settled.
A major focus of the trial was the main promotional slogan for
Splenda: "Made from sugar, so it tastes like sugar."' Apparently,
the marketing team that thought up this line was unfamiliar with
even the most basic principles of chemistry. Two products with
similar constituent elements are often vastly different, both in terms
of safety and function."'
By McNeil Nutritionals' standard, we could create a similar slo-
gan for table salt: "Made from chlorine, so it tastes like chlorine."
No doubt this seems laughable. As anyone who has swallowed pool
water can confirm, fast food chains are unlikely to start putting
chlorine packets next to the salt shaker. Nevertheless, McNeil Nutri-
tionals has successfully promoted sucralose with a slogan that uses
identical reasoning.
In its elemental form (Cl), chlorine is a powerful disinfectant
and bleaching agent. However, when the chlorine atom combines
with sodium (Na), we get common table salt (NaC1). One was used
168. For a discussion of McNeil Nutritionals' distinct marketing campaign, see
Elizabeth Esfahani, Finding the Sweet Spot, Nov. 1, 2005, http://noney.cnn.com/
magazines/business2/business2 archive/2005/11/01/8362835/index.htm ("[T]he
bottom line is, Splenda is not sugar. It is a completely artificial chemical com-
pound.").
169. See Amy S. Clark, Equal and Splenda Settle Lawsuit, May 11, 2007
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/11/business/main2793207.shtml (last
visited Apr. 6, 2010) ("Merisant was seeking more than $200 million from McNeil -
at least $183 million for unfair profits since 2003 and compensation for at least $25
million in lost sales."); For additional details of the lawsuit, see Associated Press,
Splenda Settles Lawsuit Over 'Sugar' Claim, May 11, 2007, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/18618557 (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
170. Clark, supra note 169.
171. As early as the 1820s, scientists had discovered this property of chemical
compounds. See JOHN THEODORE MERZ, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 406 (1904) ("W6hler in 1823, Liebig in 1824, and Faraday in
1825 found that entirely different qualities indicating a different constitution, could
belong to bodies that have the same elements in the same numerical proportions.").
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as a weapon during World War I, and the other is a common food
ingredient.
Another familiar example is carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon
dioxide (CO 2). If McNeil Nutritionals were charged with making up
a slogan for this gas, it might go something like the following: "Car-
bon Monoxide! Made with the same elements as carbon dioxide, so
it's just as safe as carbon dioxide." Again, this is obviously false, but
it operates under the same mistaken assumption as the sucralose
slogan, namely that chemicals with similar constituent elements have
similar qualities.
Sucrose (C6H,20,) and sucralose (C12H,,O,) are even less alike
than the preceding examples. McNeil Nutritionals makes sucralose
by chlorinating sugar. This process involves replacing three of the
hydroxyl groups (OH) with chlorine atoms and results in a major
change to the molecular structure. Ethanol provides a clear exam-
ple of how replacing a hydroxyl group creates an entirely unrelated
chemical. When ethanol (C2H6 0) is chlorinated, it becomes chloro-
ethane (C2H5Cl). The substance starts as the alcohol found in drinks
and ends up as an effective refrigerant and aerosol spray propellant.
When sugar undergoes this chlorination process to become su-
cralose, it is converted into a chlorocarbon. McNeil Nutritionals
tries to brush this matter aside by pointing out that we eat chlorine
every day in the form of table salt. By making this argument,
McNeil conveniently ignores a fundamental difference in the chemi-
cal bonds. The defining feature of chlorocarbons such as sucralose
is a covalently bonded chlorine atom. In table salt, however, sodium
and chlorine form an ionic bond to become sodium chloride. 73 The
difference between a covalent and ionic bond is night and day."
As a class, chlorocarbons consist of insecticides, pesticides,
bleaches, chemical weapons, and sucralose." Because McNeil did
172. See New York State Department of Health, The Facts about Chlorine, Aug. 5,
2004, http://www.health.state.ny.us/environmental/emergency/chemical-terrorism/
chlorinetech. htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
173. For further discussion of the difference between chlorine and chloride, see
Roald Hoffman, Legally Sweet, Vol. 95, 310 (2007), available at http://
www.americanscientist.org/issues/id.3749,y.0,no.,content.true,page.1,css.print/
issue.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
174. "If the logic of [McNeil's] argument were correct, we could all be guzzling
drain cleaner without consequence because, after all, lye, also known as sodium
hydroxide, is merely sodium, hydrogen, and oxygen-all very common components
of food." Sucralose Q&A Setting the Record Straight Part 2, 1 INTEGRATED SUPPLEMENTS
NEWSLETTER, July 2007, at 2, available at http://www.integratedsupple-
ments.com/articles/ Newsletter2007O4.pdf.
175. For a table of chlorocarbons, see MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 81-83.
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not want its artificial sweetener to be associated with these toxic sub-
stances, it created a completely new chemical category: chloro-
carbohydrates. Conveniently for McNeil, sucralose is the only
chloro-carbohydrate in the world.
Since McNeil Nutritionals can magically create a new chemical
category, perhaps it has also miraculously developed a safe chloro-
carbon. Let's see what science has to say. McNeil boasts that
"[s]ucralose has been extensively tested in more than 100 studies
during a 20-year period and found to be a safe and remarkably inert
ingredient.""' This is an incredibly crafty sentence. Anyone who
reads it would reasonably assume that those studies were long-term
and focused on human safety. Both of these assumptions, however,
would be wrong. Only three studies lasted a year or more, and none
of those involved humans. On top of this, the vast majority of trials
went unpublished. If these unpublished studies had safe results,
why would McNeil withhold them from the public? Equally disturb-
ing, more of the published studies examined whether sucralose
causes tooth decay rather than if the product is safe to consume."
You can sleep soundly at night knowing that McNeil thoroughly in-
vestigated any potential dental problems. Unfortunately, whether
sucralose has a toxic effect on the rest of your body was not a con-
cern.
The current state of safety literature is reminiscent of aspar-
tame twenty years ago. No long-term studies have been done on
humans,"' the manufacturer's own tests found evidence of toxicity
in rats,"'7 and consumers have reported many adverse reactions.'"
The Sucralose Toxicity Information Center has received complaints
linking the following ailments to sucralose: "skin rashes/flushing,
panic-like agitation, dizziness and numbness, diarrhea, swelling,
176. All About Sucralose, Sucralose Facts, http://www.sucralose.org/facts/
brochure.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
177. Oddly, all of the safety studies involving animals were published in a single
issue of one journal.
178. See MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 89 (noting that the longest safety study involv-
ing humans was just thirteen weeks).
179. Marcelle Pick, Sugar substitutes and the potential danger of Splenda, Nov.
14, 2005, http://www.womentowomen.com/healthyweight/splenda.aspx (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2010) (noting that pre-approval studies showed that sucralose "caused
shrunken thymus glands, enlarged livers, and kidney disorders in rodents").
180. See Food and Diet, Splenda, http://www.foodanddiet.com/NewFiles/
splenda-story-list.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (listing consumer complaints that
include headaches, depression, anxiety, diarrhea, vomiting, extreme fatigue, drug-
like feelings of disorientation and confusion, and more).
2010]1 63
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
muscle aches, headaches, intestinal cramping, bladder issues, and
stomach pain.""'
McNeil Nutritionals states that sucralose "passes rapidly
through the body virtually unchanged."'" Note the qualification. By
its own estimates, McNeil believes that fifteen percent of the su-
cralose humans ingest is absorbed into the body.'" Apparently to
McNeil, "virtually unchanged" is equivalent to a significant rate of
absorption. Let's give McNeil the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps it
meant that fifteen percent of a single dose of sucralose is "virtually"
negligible. Unfortunately, this fails to account for the fact that peo-
ple will be consuming multiple servings of sucralose every day for
years. Is fifteen percent over a lifetime really insignificant? Until
long-term human studies have been conducted, we won't know the
answer for certain." Until then, I ask you to consider whether a
corporation that has repeatedly deceived consumers really views
public health as a top priority.
D. Stevia
In the previous sections, we examined how pharmaceutical
companies can push their unsafe products through the FDA ap-
proval process. This section is even more alarming. It demonstrates
how powerful corporations can prevent safe, natural products from
obtaining FDA approval. The FDA's treatment of stevia provides
the clearest example of how the agency's decisions are made to
maximize corporate profits and have nothing to do with science or
consumer health. However, before we explore the extent of this
corruption, let's briefly look at why this herb is a threat to the artifi-
cial sweetener industry.
Stevia is a natural, non-caloric sweetener derived from the
South American plant Stevia rebaudiana Bertoni. When refined
181. Id.
182. All About Sucralose, http://www.sucralose.org/facts/brochure.asp (last
visited Apr. 8, 2010).
183. See B.A. John et al., The Pharmacokinetics and Metabolism of Sucralose in the
Mouse, 38 FOOD & CHEM. ToxIc. S107 (2000). The FDA estimates that between
eleven and twenty-seven percent is absorbed. Food Additives Permitted For Direct
Addition to Food for Human Consumption; Sucralose, 63 FED. REG. 16, 417, 16419
(Apr. 3, 1998).
184. See Betty Kovacs, Artificial Sweeteners, http://www.medicinenet.com/ artifi-
cial sweeteners/page9.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (stating that "the only way to
be sure of the safety of sucralose is to have long-term studies on humans done").
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into a white powder extract, stevia is approximately 300 times
sweeter than sugar.'
Unlike artificial sweeteners, independent clinical studies have
confirmed that stevia is not toxic.' The earliest safety study was
conducted in 1931, and since then, the findings have been reaf-
firmed by multiple experiments. In that first study, the researchers
determined that humans cannot digest stevia. Unlike McNeil's su-
cralose trials, this study did not need to qualify its findings with
words like "virtually" or "almost." Stevia passes through our bodies
completely unchanged.
During the 1970s, while stevia was going through the approval
process in Japan, many Japanese scientists conducted additional
tests. These trials uniformly indicated that the sweetener is safe for
human consumption.17 Since that time, stevia has been widely used
in Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland with no ill effects.
In Japan, stevia became so popular that, at one point, 1700 tons
were consumed annually," accounting for forty percent of the
sweetener market.'" More recent studies have once again confirmed
stevia's safety.'" It bears emphasizing that, unlike the artificial
sweetener safety tests, these trials were independently funded.
185. See David Richard, Questions & Answers about Stevia,
http://www.stevia.com/Stevia Article.aspx?Id=2269 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
186. See e.g., H. Fujita & T. Edahiro, Safety and utilization of stevia sweetener, 22 THE
FOOD INDUSTRY 1, 1-8 (1979); IKHLAs A. KHAN & EHAB A. ABOURASHED, LEUNGS
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMON NATURAL INGREDIENTS: USED IN FOOD, DRUGS AND
COSMETICS 577 (2009) ("Subacute toxicity studies on rats over a 50-day period up to
7.0% concentration of stevioside in feed produced no remarkable toxic effects.").
187. See e.g., H. Akashi & Y. Yokoyama, Dried Leaf Extracts of Stevia: Toxicological
Test, 18 J. JAPANESE Soc. FOOD SCI. & TECH. 34, 34-43 (1975); H. Fujita & T. Eda-
hiro, 22 J.JAPANESE Soc. FOOD SCL & TECH. 66 (1979).
188. See IKHLAs A. KHAN & EHAB A. ABOURASHED, LEUNGS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMMON NATURAL INGREDIENTS: USED IN FOOD, DRUGS AND COSMETICS 577 (2009)
(citing M. BLUMENTHAL, WHOLE FOODS 29 (1992)).
189. "[F]ood manufacturers there began using Stevia extracts to sweeten every-
thing from sweet soy sauce and pickles to Diet Coke. Stevia and its extracts have
since captured more than 40 percent of the Japanese sweetener market." Herbal
Advantage, Stevia - the 'Herbal Advantage' Over Sugar (and its Substitutes),
http://www.stevia-products.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
190. See K. Toyoda et al., Assessment of the Carcinogenicity of Stevioside in F344 Rats,
35 FOOD & CHEM. Toxic. 597, 597-603 (1997) (concluding "that stevioside is not
carcinogenic in rats under the experimental conditions described"); for a review of
additional studies, see RAY SAHELIAN & DONNA GATES, THE STEVIA COOKBOOK 28-31
("[R]esearchers determined that giving laboratory rats 550 mg/kg of stevioside
every day for two years did not cause any abnormalities.").
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At one point, upon reviewing the literature on stevia, one re-
searcher noted the following:
Few substances have ever yielded such consistently negative results in
toxicity trials as have stevia. Almost every toxicity test imaginable has
been performed on stevia extract [concentrate] or stevioside at one time
or another. The results are always negative. No abnormalities in weight
change, food intake, cell or membrane characteristics, enzyme and sub-
strate utilization, or chromosome characteristics. No cancer, no birth
defects, no acute and no chronic untoward effects. Nothing.'9'
Perhaps the best proof of stevia's safety, however, is that it has
been consumed, with no adverse effects, for more than fifteen hun-
dred years by the indigenous people of South America.'" In fact,
the Guarani tribes of Paraguay, Brazil, and Bolivia have long used
stevia to lower blood sugar'' and treat heartburn and hyperten-
sion.'" Recent research has corroborated stevia's medicinal proper-
ties.'" Additionally, since stevia is an excellent source of the anti-
oxidant superoxide dismutase, the herb may also reduce the risk of
cancer.' Not only is stevia safe, it actually has health benefits,
something no artificial sweetener can claim.
The interesting part is that the FDA should have approved ste-
via even without this safety evidence. The Federal Food, Drug, and
191. James May, Stevia - Sweetener of Choice for Future Generations,
http://www.stevia.com/SteviaArticle.aspx?d=2413 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010)
(quoting Daniel Mowrey).
192. See MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 205.
193. Id.
194. See Ashraf Tanvir, Sugar Leaf - A New Breed of 'Sweetener',
http://www.parc.gov.pk/articles/sugar_1eaf.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
195. See M.H. Hsieh et al., Efficacy and Tolerability of Oral Stevioside in Patients with
Mild Essential Hypertension: A Two-Year, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Study 25
CLINICAL THERAPY 2797, 2798 (2003) ("In this 2-year study in Chinese patients with
mild hypertension, oral stevioside significantly decreased SBP and DBP compared
with placebo. QOL was improved, and no significant adverse effects were noted.");
see R. Curi et al., Effect of Stevia Rebaudiana on Glucose Tolerance in Normal Adult
Humans, 19 BRAz. J. MED. Bio. RES. 771, 771 (1986) (finding that "[t]he extract of
Stevia rebaudiana increased glucose tolerance [and] significantly decreased plasma
glucose levels during the test and after overnight fasting in all volunteers"); see J.O.
Atteh et al., Evaluation of Supplementary Stevia (Stevia Rebaudiana, Bertoni) Leaves and
Stevioside in Broiler Diets: Effects on Feed Intake, Nutrient Metabolism, Blood Parameters
and Growth Performance, 92 J. ANIMAL PHYSIOLOGY & ANIMAL NUTRITION 640, 646-47
(2008) (finding that stevia leaves reduced blood levels of glucose, triglycerides and
triiodothyronine).
196. See S. Ghanta et al., Oxidative DNA Damage Preventive Activity and Antioxidant
Potential of Stevia Rebaudiana (Bertoni) Bertoni, a Natural Sweetener, 65 J.
AGRICULTURAL & FOOD CHEM. 10962, 10962 (2007) (concluding "that Stevia rebaudi-
ana may be useful as a potential source of natural antioxidants").
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Cosmetic Act has a carve-out for food additives Generally Recog-
nized as Safe (GRAS). The statute provides that the FDA has no
regulatory power over any "substance used in food prior to January
1, 1958, [that is determined] through either scientific procedures or
experience based on common use in food to be safe under the conditions
of its intended use."'" As already noted, stevia had been used for
more than a millennium in South America. In addition, prior to
1958, the sweetener had been commonly used in the United States.
Nevertheless, this did not stop the FDA from banning stevia in
1991 to satisfy an anonymous trade complaint.'" After nearly twenty
years and numerous Freedom of Information Act requests, the FDA
has steadfastly refused to release the name of the company that re-
quested the ban. These suspicious circumstances led Arizona con-
gressman Jon Kyl to conclude that the FDA's stevia ban is "a re-
straint of trade to benefit the artificial sweetener industry."'" Evi-
dence for this claim has mounted in recent years.
In 1992, the American Herbal Products Association submitted a
petition to the FDA requesting that stevia be granted GRAS status.
The introduction to the petition states that "various extract forms of
stevia have been extensively studied and tested. These tests include
acute, sub-acute, carcinogenic evaluation and mutagenicity studies.
These scientific data . . . demonstrate cumulatively that there is no
safety problem associated with the use of an extract of stevia. It ap-
pears to be extraordinarily safe."2' The GRAS affirmation petition
went on to cite over 900 articles dealing with stevia, and not a single
one reported any adverse health effects.20'
197. 21 U.S.C. 321, §201(s).
198. See FDA, Import Alert No. 45-06 (May 17, 1991).
199. Healthy News Service, FDA Continues Pushing Natural Herb Sweetener Stevia
Out of U.S., http://stevia.com/Stevia-article/FDA Continues PushingNatural
Herb_ SweetenerSteviaOut of US/8134 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (quoting a
1993 letter fromJohn Kyl to former FDA Commissioner David Kessler).
200. Id.
201. Id. (A 1995 supplement to the petition indicates that "[t]he petition cites
over 120 articles about stevia written before 1958, and over 900 articles published
to date. In this well-chronicled history of stevia, no author has ever reported any
adverse human health consequences associated with consumption of stevia leaf."
The petition itself states "Stevia leaf is a natural product that has been used for at
least 400 years as a food product, principally as a sweetener or other flavoring
agent. None of this common usage in foods has indicated any evidence of a safety
problem. There are no reports of any government agency in any of the above
countries indicating any public health concern whatsoever in connection with the
use of stevia in foods.").
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Despite this overwhelming evidence, the FDA refused to act un-
til Congress forced its hand in 1994. That year, Congress passed the
Dietary Supplement and Health Education Act." This law pre-
vented the FDA from regulating any dietary supplement unless it
was proven unsafe. Because studies did not attribute any health
risks to stevia, the FDA was forced to allow manufacturers to market
the herb as a dietary supplement. The agency, however, still refused
to approve stevia for use as a sweetener.
Due to the strict regulations regarding the labeling, marketing,
and sales of dietary supplements,"' many consumers still wanted the
partial ban lifted. In spite of public support for stevia,0 6 the FDA
refused to grant approval. At one point, the FDA claimed its con-
cerns were largely based on the work of Mauro Alvarez.05 Upon
learning of this, Alvarez wrote that the FDA had clearly misinter-
preted his research:
[T]he only possible way to report that the results showed detrimental ef-
fects is by taking information out of context. If this is the case, one con-
cludes that these FDA scientists are incompetent and irresponsible, or if
not, they must belong to some sort of conspiracy group to carry on a
sinister agenda against this plant with the objective to keep it away from
American consumers by attributing to it safety issues that do not exist.m
Nevertheless, for more than a decade, the FDA stuck to the bi-
zarre position that stevia was a safe "dietary supplement" but a toxic
"food additive."m2 " Never mind the fact that stevia could legally be
added to foods in the exact same manner as a food additive so long
202. Dietary Supplement and Health Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417,
108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
203. See Cooking with Stevia, The FDA and the 1st Amendment or Why The
Book Cooking With Stevia Was Banned!, http://www.cookingwithstevia.com (last
visited Apr. 7, 2010) ("Simply suggesting that the stevia be mixed with water could
be construed as mislabeling and force a recall of the products.").
204. Recall that the FDA refused to ban saccharin because it would upset some
consumers. Apparently, consumer support only matters when it aligns with corpo-
rate profits. See note 95 and accompanying text.
205. Stevia.net, The 19 Studies, http://www.stevia.net/19studies.htm (last visited
Apr. 7, 2010).
206. Letter from Mauro Alvarez, Professor, Parque Tecnologico Agro-Industrial
do Oeste Uan. 19, 1998) available at http://www.stevia.net/19studies.htm.
207. Many have attributed stevia's paradoxical state to the power of big business.
See e.g., Alexandra Marks, Bitter Dispute Over All-Natural Sweetener, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, Sept. 1, 1999, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0901/
p2sl.html ("They say it's safe as long as you use it as a dietary supplement, but if
you try to use it as a food it's unsafe? The battle goes back to influence on the FDA
from the artificial sweetener industry." (quoting James Kirkland, author of The
Stevia Cookbook)).
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as the product was labeled a "dietary supplement." These strict
supplement regulations, however, did have several important effects.
They made major grocery chains reluctant to carry the herb, relegat-
ing the sale of stevia to health food stores. This ensured that the
vast majority of consumers were unaware of stevia and, in doing so,
preserved the market share of artificial sweeteners. For these rea-
sons, the FDA's partial ban could not have been due to safety con-
cerns. It was done purely for economic profit. Remember, in the
FDA's view, corporate health comes before consumer health.
Then suddenly, in 2008, the FDA had a change of heart and
began allowing stevia to be marketed as a sweetener. What could
engender this reversal? Had a new conclusive scientific study been
published? Nope, merely the players supporting stevia had changed.
In May 2008, Cargill, Merisant, Coca-Cola, and Pepsi submitted peti-
tions to the FDA asking that stevia be granted GRAS approval. For
the past two decades, the FDA had denied the exact same requests
from consumer groups. However, now that major corporations
were behind stevia, the FDA decided it must be safe for consump-
tion. It seems like corporate backing and not science dictates safety.
Maybe if corporations wished hard enough, cigarettes would magi-
cally become safe, too?1
At any rate, in order to fully appreciate the FDA's reversal, one
must understand the companies behind the petitions. Merisant is
the maker of aspartame-based Equal. Due to the rising popularity of
sucralose, Merisant's share of the artificial sweetener market had
declined substantially. In fact, sales had fallen so much that the
company was pushed into bankruptcy.
Since sucralose had become the dream artificial sweetener in
terms of taste and usability, Merisant needed a completely new ap-
proach if it hoped to return to profitability. The company ulti-
mately decided to capitalize on the natural and organic trends that
are spreading across America. This meant finding a natural product
208. See e.g., Erica Orden, Calorie-Free, Stevia's 11-Year War with FDA, Newsday,
May 2, 2006, available at http://www.steaz.com/pdf/news_2006/News-
day05O6.pdf. "In January 2004, Steaz, a Pennsylvania-based natural soda manufac-
turer, introduced a diet line made with stevia rather than aspartame or Nutrasweet.
To comply with the legal guidelines, the company can't market it as a soda or even
as a beverage (it calls the product a dietary supplement) and must list 'supplement
facts' rather than 'nutrition facts' on its back label.
209. See generally MIcHAELs, supra note 12, at 3-11.
210. See Chelsea Emery et. al., Merisant, Maker of Equa4 Gets $20 mln DIP Financ-
ing, REUTERS, http://in.reuters.com/article/privateEquity/idNN1232403220090112
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
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that could compete with sucralose. Lo and behold, stevia was the
perfect candidate. Merisant developed a stevia-based sweetener
called PureVia'" and teamed up with Pepsi to market a line of diet
soft drinks."'
Cargill followed a somewhat similar path. Although it is Amer-
ica's largest agricultural corporation,'13 it had never entered the arti-
ficial sweetener market. Like Merisant, Cargill saw that the trend
was moving towards natural products. Therefore, it developed Tru-
via,' another stevia-based sweetener, and teamed up with Coca-Cola
to produce diet soft drinks."'
At this point, there was still one minor problem. The FDA had
consistently claimed that stevia was not safe for humans. But with
four major corporations now backing stevia (Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Car-
gill, and Merisant), the agency's stance quickly changed.
As previously noted, these corporations asked that stevia be
given GRAS approval in May of 2008. The FDA handled this re-
quest in an extremely clever way. Instead of granting GRAS ap-
proval which would have allowed every company to use the sweet-
ener, the FDA issued a letter of "no objection."" This means that
the FDA does not object now, but it may object later. Essentially,
the FDA has reserved the right to selectively target companies. Al-
though it has not yet done so, the FDA can allow Coca-Cola and
Pepsi to market stevia while preventing smaller companies from
producing the sweetener."
211. PureVia contains the following ingredients: erythritol, isomaltulose, stevia
extract, cellulose powder, and natural flavors. Lynn Smythe, Zero Calorie Stevia
Sweeteners, http://spices.suiteI01.com/article.cfm/zero-calorie-stevia-sweeteners
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
212. Betsy McKay, FDA Clears Use of Herb As Sweetener, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008,
at B3.
213. Andrea D. Murphy & John J. Ray, America's Largest Private Companies,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/28/largest-private-companies-business-private-
companies-09_land.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (listing Cargill as #1 with reve-
nue of $106.3 billion);
214. Truvia contains the following ingredients: stevia extract, erythritol, and natu-
ral flavors. Smythe, supra note 211.
215. Cargill, Honestly Sweet, http://www.cargill.com/connections/more-stories/
truvia-natural-sweetener/indexjsp (last visited Aug. 6, 2010).
216. McKay, supra note 212; see Mike Adams, FDA Approves Stevia, Ends the Era
of Oppression of this Herbal Sweetener - Update 1, http://www.naturalnews.com/
News_000626_steviaTruviaFDA.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (stating that the
FDA's issuance of "no objection" letters really means "the FDA hasn't technically
granted approval to stevia but has affirmed it will not object to companies using it
in foods and beverages.").
217. See Adams, supra note 216.
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Over the past twenty years, stevia has had quite the adventure.
One commentator sums up the sweetener's history quite nicely:
When stevia threatened the profits of aspartame, it was routinely sup-
pressed by the agency. FDA thugs seized imports of stevia at the border,
destroyed millions of dollars in stevia products, threatened companies
with fines for daring to sell stevia, and even ordered one company to de-
stroy its recipe books that mentioned stevia in dessert recipes. But now,
when Coca-Cola and Pepsi want stevia approved, the FDA suddenly re-
218
verses its oppression and decides to legalize the herb.
Although stevia's use as a food additive benefits Americans, the
process by which it was approved presents a disturbing picture.
Corporations routinely manipulate the FDA to maximize profits. If
a product hurts the bottom line, the FDA bans it. If it helps the bot-
tom line, the FDA approves it. Science and safety are irrelevant.
Obviously, fundamental change is needed."' Minor tweaks will only
whitewash the problem. Industry must no longer be permitted to
corrupt the FDA. The final part of this Article presents two major
reforms that can provide the change we need.
III. TAKING INDUSTRY OUT OF THE FDA
Senator Charles Grassley plainly identified the problem when
he said that the FDA "needs to reestablish its relationship with its
own scientists and distance itself from the drug industry. The FDA
needs to get rid of its mind-set that it's a facilitator for the drug in-
dustry and become regulator once again. The FDA's focus should
be only on science and the public good.""o
The first section describes the current FDA approval process.
The final two sections present reforms that will take industry out of
the FDA and ensure that the agency adheres to its mission of "pro-
tecting the public health," not filling the corporate coffers."'
218. Id.
219. See H.R. REP. No. 104-436, at 12-13 (1995) ("Manipulation of the food addi-
tive review process for anti-competitive purposes is inconsistent with the purposes
of premarket review.")
220. Jonathan D. Rockoff, FDA Scientists Report Their Safety Concerns in Poll, L.A.
TIMES, July 21, 2006, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/
21/nation/na-fda21.
221. FDA, supra note 9.
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A. FDA Approval Process
After a pharmaceutical company develops a drug," it conducts
preclinical testing in laboratory animals. Next, the company submits
its results to the FDA in the form of an Investigational New Drug
Application (IND). By examining the IND, the FDA determines
whether it is safe for the drug company to begin testing on humans.
If the FDA approves the IND, the pharmaceutical company can
begin the first of three clinical stages. Phase one studies generally
use small sample sizes and are conducted on healthy volunteers.
The main objective is to identify common side effects and determine
how humans absorb and excrete the drug.
The FDA reviews these results and allows the corporation to
move onto phase two if the product does not appear unacceptably
dangerous. The corporation's goal in phase two is to prove effec-
tiveness. These studies use a moderate sample size (up to 300 par-
ticipants). To determine if the drug works, subjects in the test
group are given the new drug and subjects in the control group are
given a placebo or a different FDA-approved drug.
If the corporation can provide evidence of the drug's efficacy,
the FDA allows phase three to begin. In this final phase, the phar-
maceutical company conducts large-scale tests with up to 3,000 sub-
jects. The purpose of this phase is to check the drug's safety and
effectiveness in different populations and at different dosages.
After phase three, the drug company submits a New Drug Ap-
plication to the FDA. This report should contain all of the data and
results gathered during the previous tests. However, as evidenced
most prominently by G.D. Searle's aspartame reports, damning data
is often withheld.
The FDA forms a review team consisting of medical doctors,
chemists, statisticians, microbiologists, pharmacologists, and other
experts to evaluate whether the drug company's trials show conclu-
sive evidence of safety and effectiveness. At times, the FDA calls on
advisory committees for help. Finally, higher level directors deter-
mine whether the drug should be approved. "'
At first glance, this appears to be a relatively sound approval
process. However, there are two major flaws that should make
Americans question the reliability of the FDA's conclusions. First,
due to their close financial ties to the businesses they are regulat-
222. Food additives undergo a similar but less rigorous process.
223. For a more detailed explanation of the process, see FDA, supra note 11.
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ing,"' the people making the final decisions are often guided more
by politics than scientific analysis." This is particularly true of top
directors and commissioners who often leave the FDA and join
pharmaceutical companies or lobbying firms for especially lucrative
salaries.2 "' As a remedy to this problem, the next section will pro-
pose life tenure and strengthened conflict-of-interest regulations.
The second major flaw in the current approval process is that
pharmaceutical companies conduct the studies to determine their
own products' safety and effectiveness. Since drug companies only
care about profit maximization, they are not concerned with accu-
rately assessing a product's health risks. This has caused the indus-
try to employ countless deceptive strategies to trick the FDA and the
general public into believing that toxic chemicals are actually safe.
To guarantee that the FDA's decisions are based on valid data, the
final section advocates adopting a system that takes industry out of
science.
B. Locking the Revolving Door
Currently, thirty-six percent of FDA scientists feel they cannot
express "concerns about public health without fear of retaliation."2
Since more than one-third of researchers are afraid to do their jobs,
the FDA obviously needs to reform its entire culture.
224. See Andrew Bridges, Ex-FDA Chief Pleads Guilty in Stock Case, THE WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/17/AR2006101700573.html ("Former FDA Com-
missioner Lester Crawford pleaded guilty Tuesday to conflict of interest and false
reporting of information about stocks he owned in food, beverage and medical
device companies he was in charge of regulating.").
225. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 5, at 3 (quoting a scientist from
the Center of Devices and Radiological Health as saying "In my experience, it is
never the 'low level' reviewers in the FDA who breach the integrity of our work. It
is usually at much higher levels, such as center directors and above. Those higher
levels are so far removed from the scientific work we do that politics has even more
sway over their decisions.").
226. The FDA's revolving door is well documented. See e.g., Mike Palmedo, Re-
volving Door Between the U.S. Government and Industry, http://www.cptech.org/
ip/health/politics/revolvingdoor.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010); Jennifer Ferrara,
Revolving Doors: Monsanto and the Regulators, 28 THE ECOLOGIST 280, 280-87 (1998);
Policy Directions Inc., Professionals: Lester M. Crawford, DVM, PhD, Senior Sci-
ence Advisor, http://www.policydirections.com/professionals.php?queue=crawford
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (Former FDA Commissioner Lester Crawford is now
working for a Washington lobbying firm, Policy Directions Inc.).
227. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 5, at 3.
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Agency scientists have made it clear that any solution should
start with high level directors.' Therefore, the new system must
focus on developing a culture of independence at the top. For our
purposes, the top means the FDA Commissioner and the forty-eight
advisory committees.
In order to create an independent agency, all conflicts of inter-
est must first be eliminated. "A conflict of interest is a set of condi-
tions in which professional judgment concerning a primary interest
(such as a patient's welfare or the validity of research) tends to be
unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain)."
Because even the smallest secondary ties can create undue influ-
ence, 2o committee members must be completely removed from the
industries they will be regulating.
In theory, each committee should consist of independent ex-
perts who advise the agency on product safety and effectiveness.3
Recognizing that an extremely important requirement is independ-
ence, federal law already forbids anyone with a conflict of interest
from serving on an advisory committee. However, given the ease
with which waivers are granted, this prohibition has become mean-
ingless.
The FDA published a whopping twenty-two page document for
determining a conflict of interest.2" Despite these lengthy rules,
228. Id. at 2, ("Less than half (44 percent) say they 'respect the integrity and pro-
fessionalism of FDA leadership."').
229. Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 573, 573 (1993).
230. See generally, JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: How MEDICINE'S COMPLICITY
WITH BIG BusINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 1-24 (2005) (describing how even
insignificant gifts like pens and coffee mugs can create a conflict of interest that
influences doctors).
231. See Food and Drug Administration, Advisory Committees, http://
www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (The
FDA "uses 48 committees and panels to obtain independent expert advice on scien-
tific, technical, and policy matters." (emphasis added)).
232. See Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for the Public, FDA Advisory
Committee Members, and FDA Staff on Procedures for Determining Conflict of Interest and
Eligibility for Participation in FDA Advisory Committees (2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM125646
.pdf.
233. See MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 163 ("[B]etween 1998 and 2000, the FDA
waived [the conflict of interest] restriction more than 800 times.").
234. See Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for the Public, FDA Advisory
Committee Members, and FDA Staff on Procedures for Determining Conflict of Interest and
Eligibility for Participation in FDA Advisory Committees (2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/07d-0101-gdlOOO1.pdf.
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"doctors who earn hundreds of thousands of dollars each year in
'consulting fees' from drug companies are not only allowed to vote
on the recommendations for FDA approval of their drugs, there is
not even any FDA requirement to disclose such conflicts of inter-
est.""' Instead of complex guidelines, the agency could use a
straightforward one-sentence test: Within the past five years, have
you or your immediate family had financial ties to the industry you
will be regulating? If the answer is yes, the person is disqualified,
regardless of expertise. Financial ties would include more than
monetary compensation. Any sort of remuneration would preclude
someone from serving in a top level position. This is a necessary
measure so that corporations do not influence experts with vaca-
tions, televisions, cars, meals, or other incentives.
So where do we get enough pure souls to staff the FDA com-
mittees? After all, more than half of the current advisory commit-
tees have financial ties to the companies they are regulating."' This
is a troubling statistic, but there is a bit of hope contained within it.
Nearly half of the advisory committees did not have financial con-
flicts of interest. Since the FDA can currently staff almost half of its
panels with independent experts, there is no reason it cannot fill all
of its panels with such people. Although this Article has painted a
stark picture, the vast majority of scientists at the FDA are commit-
ted to protecting the public health. Therefore, promoting from
within is one viable option.
Because only the FDA commissioner and the committee mem-
bers will be subject to the five year regulation, people with recent
ties to industry will still be able to work at the FDA. However, by
barring them from immediately taking high-level positions, the cul-
ture of the agency will change. This top-down approach will foster a
sense of independence within the FDA. It will also allow low level
scientists to do their job without fear of retribution from their supe-
riors. No longer will the FDA and corporations be partners in a
quest for greater profits.
Another option is to recruit scientists from universities. Admit-
tedly, industry has tainted medical schools, but in recent years, many
have committed to regaining independence. This past year, Har-
vard Medical School strengthened its conflict of interest regulations,
235. Mike Adams, Americans Fed up with Drug Industry Influence, FDA Corrup-
tion, Reveals Remarkable Consumer Reports Survey, http://www.naturainews.
com/021795.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
236. See MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 163.
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and other schools have followed suit.3 7 Trade organizations have
pressured other schools to make similar policy changes. The Asso-
ciation of American Medical Colleges views connections between
researchers and industry as a "peril to academic medicine and pub-
lic health."2" The American Medical Student Association now rates
schools based on their conflict of interest policies. In 2008, just
eight schools obtained an "A" ranking." In 2009, that number in-
creased to twelve, with forty-seven other schools earning a "B" rank-
ing.20 As universities continue their reforms, they will become an
even better resource for the FDA.
Now that we have identified our candidate pool, how does the
FDA make its selection? Because the judiciary is the most trusted
branch,4 it serves as a good model for FDA committees. To begin,
an oversight committee should be created. The members of this
panel should be granted life tenure. They shall be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.
When vacancies need to be filled on any of the forty-eight sub-
committees, the FDA commissioner will nominate a candidate and
the oversight committee will approve or reject the nomination.
When a new drug or food additive application is submitted, the ap-
propriate subcommittee will review the available studies and make a
recommendation. The oversight committee will have the final say
237. See Liz Kowalczyk, Harvard Will Stiffen Rules for Staff at Med School,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 3, 2009, available at http-//www.boston.com/news/local/
massachusetts/articles/2009/02/03/harvard willstiffen_rulesfor staffatmed
school (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) ("Many top medical schools, including Stanford
University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California at Los Ange-
les and at San Francisco, and the University of Massachusetts have adopted stricter
policies in the past two years.").
238. Susan Ehringhaus & David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Re-
search, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGIES (Winter 2002), available at
http://www.issues.org/19.2/ehringhaus.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
239. Dane Secor, AAMC joins Movement to Restrict Pharmaceutical Company-
Physician Relationships, 6 ACAD. INTERNAL MED. INSIGHT 6 (2008) ("Only eight out of
the approximately 150 medical schools surveyed received an 'A,' which indicates the
institution has strong policies that address conflicts of interest caused by pharma-
ceutical industry marketing.").
240. See AMERICAN MEDICAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION, CONFLICT OF INTEREST
POLICIES AT ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTERS, http://www.amsascorecard.org (last vis-
ited Apr. 7, 2010).
241. See generally Frank Newport, Americans' Trust in Legislative Branch at Re-
cord Low, GALLUP, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/122897/
americans-trust-legislative-branch-record-low.aspx (Since 1974, Americans have
trusted the judiciary more than the executive or legislative branches.).
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on all applications, but great deference should be given to the deci-
sion of the subcommittees.
For five years after stepping down, the FDA commissioner and
committee members will be unable to accept any compensation
from a regulated industry. This is a necessary measure to prevent
corporations from making promises of future gain to entice regula-
tors to approve a drug or food additive. This is not an unfamiliar
proposal, but its enforcement would be novel. In the past, Presi-
dents have placed similar restrictions on some of their appointees.
Unfortunately, they have merely served as talking points rather than
stringent policies."'
The proposal does not provide for a perfect selection mecha-
nism, but any effective system will inevitably produce false positives.
If the policy is overly restrictive, we can rest assured that it is much
better to exclude too many people than to permit those with bad
intentions to control the FDA.
The most common argument in favor of the revolving door is
that industry consultants are the only people with sufficient exper-
tise to evaluate the latest drugs. Jerome P. Kassirer, the former Edi-
tor-in-Chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, calls this claim
the "fallacy of unique expertise.""' He argues that we should not
need to rely on conflicted experts because independent scientists
quickly develop the necessary skills." In fact, relying on industry
experts may be detrimental for reasons beyond the obvious conflict
of interest. When people with similar views come together, they are
subject to group polarization.' Because the industry experts are
already sympathetic to pharmaceutical companies, this bias will be
amplified when they try to reach a group consensus.'
242. President Clinton enacted a measure that prevented certain appointees from
working in regulated industry. In the last days of his presidency, he repealed the
measure. Likewise, President Obama's restrictions are set to expire at the end of
his presidency.
243. KASSIRER, supra note 230, at 204.
244. See id. at 204-05 ("[N]obody has provided any evidence that people with
financial ties to industry are better in assessing evidence on any a particular subject
than those without such ties . . . . There is no fundamental reason to think that such
panels of intelligent clinicians who have no industry connections would be unable
to assess a body of clinical data and arrive at useful recommendations.").
245. See generally, Cass Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization 1-15 (John M. Olin
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 91, 1999), available at www.law.vchicago.edu/
Files/Files/9 1.CRS_.Polarization.pdf.
246. See KAssIRER, supra note 230, at 205 ("[T]here is real risk that like-minded
people with 'unique' knowledge may have similarities of thought and come up with
a uniform conclusion that is biased (or even completely wrong).").
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Even if one concedes that industry scientists are the most quali-
fied experts, this argument ignores a more fundamental issue. The
FDA will make better decisions if it is run by good, independent
scientists than if it is run by excellent, corrupt scientists. Nonethe-
less, as discussed above, there is no reason to believe that the FDA
will be unable to staff its committees with excellent, independent
scientists.
Now that we have setup independent committees, the next step
is to determine what standard they should apply when approving
new substances. It is clear that the FDA must presume a product is
unsafe until studies show otherwise,"4 so three possibilities jump to
mind: preponderance of the evidence,"' clear and convincing evi-
dence,"' and beyond a reasonable doubt."'0 In choosing a standard,
our goal should be to build in a margin of safety without unduly
restricting food and drugs from reaching the market.
For this reason, I think it is fair to rule out preponderance of
the evidence. If the committee determines it is only slightly more
probable than fifty percent that the food or drug is safe, it should
deny the application. On balance, it is better to reject a product that
is harmless than approve a product that is dangerous. After all, the
rejected substance can undergo additional tests to better ascertain
247. The law already provides for this presumption, even though recent history
seems to indicate that the FDA presumes a substance is safe until proven otherwise.
See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) ("No such regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation
of the data before the Secretary-fails to establish that the proposed use of the
food additive, under the conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be
safe . . . .").
248. See Neil Orloff &Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-
of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983) (noting that the tradi-
tional preponderance of the evidence standard "requires demonstrating that the
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence").
249. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2004) (defining clear and convincing
evidence as "evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or
reasonably certain. This is a greater burden than preponderance of the evidence,
the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, the norm for criminal trials.").
250. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850)) (defining reasonable doubt as "a term
often used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It is not a mere
possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on
moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the
case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds ofjurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.").
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its safety, but once the toxic food or drug enters the market, the
damage is done.
The more difficult decision involves choosing between clear
and convincing evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. They
both prove useful in their own way.
At present, food additives require less rigorous testing than
drugs. This is backwards. Although it may seem counterintuitive at
first, the standard required to approve food additives should be
higher than drugs. Accordingly, I recommend using the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard for food additives and the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard for drugs.
Food additives are generally marketed on a national scale and
included in many products. Due to the sheer number of options,
most people do not know which products contain which additives.
Therefore, when someone consumes an additive, it is, with few ex-
ceptions, the result of an indirect choice.
For example, no one buys Swedish Fish gummy candies because
they want to eat the food dye Red No. 40. People buy the candy
because they like the taste. In fact, I would wager that most people
who have eaten Swedish Fish never even thought about what food
additive is used to make the red coloring. To go one step further,
despite the fact that Red No. 40 is the most widely used food color-
ing,"' the vast majority of Americans have likely never even consid-
ered its safety. FDA approval is such a powerful signal that millions
of people are willing to eat food additives everyday just because the
FDA says it is okay. The faith is so strong that the average American
consumes 150 pounds of food additives each year,' ten pounds of
which are chemical in nature.
Another argument for a beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
that the costs of a false negative are much lower. Rejecting a safe
food additive will not lead to deaths or prevent the cure of diseases.
On the other hand, denying the application for a safe drug can
251. The History of Food Dyes, http://www.red40.com/pages/history.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010). Manufacturers use this orange-red color in all sorts of gelatins,
beverages, dairy products and condiments. FDA certified more than 3 million
pounds of the dye in fiscal year 1992-almost a million pounds more than the run-
ner-up, FD&C Yellow No. 5. Id.
252. DEANNA MINICH, AN A-Z GUIDE TO FOOD ADDITIVES: NEVER EAT WHAT You
CAN'T PRONOUNCE 10 (2009).
253. The Myth of Convenience- Which Nutritional Supplement Ingredients May Be Si-
lently Undermining Your Health?, 1 INTEGRATED SUPPLEMENTS NEWSLETTER 4 (Inte-
grated Supplements), April 2007, at 1, available at http://www.integratedsupple-
ments.com/articles/Newsletter2007O4.pdf.
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cause people to die or otherwise reduce their quality of life. Fur-
thermore, although Americans consume more drugs than people in
any other nation,M the total still pales in comparison to the amount
of food additives we consume.
But the principal reason that the FDA should use a clear and
convincing evidence standard for drugs is that taking medicine is a
concerted choice. Although chemical additives are crammed into
nearly every food imaginable, drugs are not. No one buys a differ-
ent brand of cereal one day only to find out that it is loaded with
drugs.
There is also a line of defense between the FDA and the con-
sumer. As experts on medication, doctors are supposed to inform
the patient of the side effects and benefits of prescriptions. This
process adds a layer of reflection to taking drugs, something that is
absent from food additives. For these reasons, the FDA should re-
verse its policy, and food additives should be held to a higher stan-
dard than drugs.
Now that we have laid out an approval process, one key feature
is still missing: data. Even if the committee members are independ-
ent experts, their decisions can only be as good as the studies they
review. Therefore, it is imperative that industry no longer be per-
mitted to participate in the testing process. The following section
explores an alternative system that can ensure these new independ-
ent FDA committees are only reviewing high quality studies.
C. Taking Industry out of Safety Trials
Pharmaceutical companies are skilled at manipulating data in
ways that cast their products in a favorable light. One common tac-
tic is to fund dozens of clinical trials with the expectation that only a
few studies will be published."' Random chance explains why this is
a useful but deceptive strategy. To be accepted by the scientific
community, the results of an experiment must be statistically signifi-
cant at the five percent level. In statistical terms, the p-value must
be < .05. This means that if a drug is no different than a placebo,"'
only five percent of the experiments will have data at least this ex-
treme.
254. Associated Press, American's Remain World's Most Medicated People, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, April 17, 2005, http://www.sptimes.com/2005/0
4 /1 7/
Worldandnation/Americans remainworl.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
255. See MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 150.
256. This is the null hypothesis.
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From the pharmaceutical industry's perspective, if a drug is in-
effective, ninety five percent of its clinical trials will yield data sup-
porting this conclusion. However, due to random chance, five per-
cent of its trials will still provide evidence that the drug is beneficial.
By funding dozens of experiments, corporations are exploiting the
test for statistical significance. The drug manufacturer holds back
the ninety five percent of trials that show the product's inefficacy."'
At the same time, it publishes the five percent of trials that attest to
the drug's usefulness."
Another common ploy is to truncate data. If a clinical trial lasts
for two years and the results show that a given drug is ineffective,
industry scientists simply look at smaller chunks of the data. Maybe
the trial passes the test for statistical significance during a one year
period. Maybe six months is the magic number." If cutting out
time doesn't work, the beneficiaries can also be reframed. Instead
of using data for the entire population, industry scientists often look
at smaller demographics. If the drug doesn't have an effect on
Asians, don't worry. Simply drop them from the study. Do Hispan-
ics meet the test for significance? If so, leave them in. When that
doesn't work, get more creative. Maybe the magic group is women
aged twenty-seven to thirty-two with blue eyes.s" Never mind that
only a couple trial participants may have fallen into this category.
Even more deceptive tactics include fabricating data, discon-
tinuing studies that yield unfavorable results, and excluding individ-
ual subjects that develop adverse reactions, such as malignant tu-
mors. When these strategies are insufficient, corporations have
257. Although data for all of the trials is required to be submitted to the FDA,
many corporations withhold adverse studies.
258. See, Erik H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and its
Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 255 (2008) (Ninety-four
percent of the published studies reported positive results, whereas only 51% of the
FDA-registered studies had positive results. "Overall, the studies that the FDA
judged as positive were approximately 12 times as likely to be published" as neutral
or negative studies.); see also David S. Liebeskind et al., Evidence of Publication Bias in
Reporting Acute Stroke Clinical Trials, 67 NEUROLOGY 973, 973 (2006) (concluding
that "publication bias is evident in the acute stroke research literature").
259. The drug manufacturer Pharmacia used this strategy to provide evidence
that Celebrex reduces the incidence of ulcers. The highly respected Journal of the
American Medical Association was fooled into publishing this "science." See
MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 150.
260. VaxGen manipulated the data for AidsVax, an AIDS vaccine, in a similarly
absurd manner. See MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 151.
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simply ordered their scientists to write favorable reports regardless
of the evidence."'
The extent of these manipulative practices is easily observed
when independent scientists conduct meta-analyses. Although this
article has focused on how pharmaceutical companies employed
these misleading tactics to gain FDA approval for artificial sweeten-
ers, the problem is much more pervasive. Richard Smith, the Edi-
tor-in-Chief of the British Medical Journal, has pointed out several
other notable examples of industry bias:
"The major determinant of whether reviews of passive smoking con-
cluded it was harmful was whether the authors had financial ties with
tobacco manufacturers. In the disputed topic of whether third-
generation contraceptive pills cause an increase in thromboembolic dis-
ease, studies funded by the pharmaceutical industry find that they don't,
and studies funded by public money find that they do."2
62
This abuse of the scientific process undermines both industry
and independent research. It essentially creates a presumption that
corporate science is false, going so far as to taint companies that do
not engage in deceptive practices. As the junk science piles up, the
public is pushed towards a tipping point."' When distrust of science
reaches this critical mass, it will be extremely hard to convince
Americans that scientific results cannot be bought by the highest
bidder. The inevitable result is that the public will lose confidence
in science as a whole. The first effects of this phenomenon are al-
ready being felt.
For example, many parents refuse to vaccinate their children
because they do not believe the science that shows vaccines are
safe.2 ' Fear of industry deception has led to actual problems, such
261. See Keith J. Winstein & David Armstrong, Top Pain Scientist Fabricated Data in
Studies, Hospital Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at A12. (Scott S. Reuben, former
chief of acute pain at Baystate Medical Center fabricated data for twenty-one stud-
ies involving Vioxx, Celebrex, and Lyrica. Pfizer (maker of Celebrex and Lyrica)
funded part of Reuben's research and paid him generous speaking fees.) For addi-
tional examples of these tactics, see footnotes 144-149 and accompanying text.
262. Richard Smith, Making Progress with Competing Interests, 325 BRIT. MED. J.
1375, 1375-76 (2002).
263. Malcolm Gladwell describes the tipping point as "the moment of critical
mass, the threshold, the boiling point." See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING
POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 12 (2002).
264. See Nadja Popovich, Vaccine Scare Shows How Emotions Can Trump Facts, NPR
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/02/risky-business reactions-to-th.html
(last visited May 23, 2010).
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as an increased incidence of measles." A more salient example in-
volves the HINI vaccine." Many people declined to get vaccina-
tions because they believed the pharmaceutical companies were
promoting unsafe vaccines." Although the HiN1 virus did not be-
come a major threat, it is easy to envision a scenario in which an
actual epidemic breaks out and people refuse to get vaccinated.
The loss of faith in science is not limited to health issues. The
polarizing debate over global warming has accentuated the prob-
lem." Ralph Cicerone, president of the National Academy of Sci-
ences noted that "[t]here is evidence that the corrosion in the public
attitude to climate science has spread over to other areas of sci-
ence."'"
The lesson to be learned is that industry-funded science un-
dermines legitimate science. Government agencies must stop using
it as a basis for decisions. Given the importance of public health,
the FDA, in particular, should only rely on independently funded
trials.
With this in mind, an entirely new pre-market approval system
must be implemented. There are two options for such a system.
First, the FDA could take on the responsibility of conducting the
clinical trials. This presents some tangible benefits. For instance,
because studies would be done in-house, an intermediate layer of
FDA scientists would not need to review the trials. Additionally, as
265. Rong-Gong Lin II, Rise in Measles Prompts Concern, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2008,
available at http://articles.1atimes.com/2008/may/02/local/me-vaccine2 (last vis-
ited May 23, 2010); see also BBC News, Rise in Measles 'Very Worrying',
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7872541.stm (last visited May 23, 2010).
266. See Paul A. Offit, Nothing to Fear but the Flu Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, at
A23, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/opinion/12offit.html?_r-2&em (last
visited May 23, 2010).
267. Id.
268. See Rasmussen Reports, Americans Skeptical of Science Behind Global
Warming, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/current
events/environment-energy/americans skeptical-of science behind-global-warmi
ng (last visited May 23, 2010). A recent poll noted the following:
Fifty-nine percent (59%) of Americans say it's at least somewhat likely that
some scientists have falsified research data to support their own theories
and beliefs about global warming. Thirty-five percent (35%) say it's Very
Likely. Just 26% say it's not very or not at all likely that some scientists fal-
sified data. This skepticism does not appear to be the result of the recent
disclosure of e-mails confirming such data falsification as part of the so-
called "Climategate" scandal. Id.
269. Clive Cookson, Public Losing Faith in Science, FINANCIAL TIMES
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/1700ab46-ldbc-1 ldf-9e98-00l44feab49a.html (last
visited May 23, 2010).
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the people running the studies and the people making approval de-
cisions would be working within the same agency, communication
should be more open. This may lead to better information when
questions arise at the top.
On the downside, the federal government is not known for its
efficiency."'o Even if one does not subscribe to this view, a majority
of the American people do, and that provides a compelling reason
to prevent an FDA expansion. First, the public no longer trusts the
federal government." They think it is corrupt and inefficient."
The average American believes the federal government wastes half
of all its revenues.' In addition, a majority of Americans want
smaller government." These views have become even more domi-
nant during the current recession.
As another matter, corporate America constitutes a powerful
interest group that will oppose any reform of the FDA's regulatory
system. An expansion of government would provide powerful am-
270. Friedrich Hayek nicely sums up a major tenet of classical liberalism, calling
the free market a "more efficient allocation of resources than any design could
achieve." CHRISTINA PETSOULAS, HAYEK'S LIBERALISM AND ITS ORIGINS: His IDEA OF
SPONTANEOUS ORDER AND THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 2 (2001).
271. See Jason luliano, Eliminating Earmarks: Why the Congressional Line Item Vote
can Succeed Where the Presidential Line Item Veto Failed, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 947, 957-
58 (2010); Andy Barr, Poll Finds Low Trust in Feds, http://
www.politico.com/news/ stories/0109/17424.html (last visited May 23, 2010) (For
example, a recent poll of registered voters found that "[o]nly 5 percent said they
have a 'great deal' of trust that the federal government will manage its finances
responsibly, while 23 percent expressed 'some' trust that the government will be
financially responsible. Meanwhile, an overwhelming 63 percent of respondents
described their amount of trust as 'not very much' or 'none at all."').
272. See CNN, Half of Americans Think Congress is Corrupt,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POL1T1CS/10/19/congress.poll/index.html (last
visited May 23, 2010).
273. See Lydia Saad, Americans: Uncle Sam Wastes 50 Cents on the Dollar,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122 9 5 1/americans-uncle-sam-wastes-50-cents-dollar.
aspx (last visited May 23, 2010) (finding that "Americans believe 50 cents of every
tax dollar that goes to the government in Washington, D.C., today are wasted").
274. See e.g., David Boaz, Americans Want Smaller Government, http://www.cato-
at-liberty.org/2009/06/23/americans-want-smaller-government (last visited May 23,
2010) (citing a Washington Post-ABC News poll that found Americans prefer
smaller government to larger government by a margin of 54 to 41); Rasmussen
Reports, National Survey of 1,000 Likely Voters Conducted March 18-19, 2009
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/toplines/ptsurvey-top-
lines/march_2009/toplines-benchmarksmarch_18_19_2009 (last visited May 23,
2010) (finding that 66% of Americans prefer a smaller government with lower taxes
and only 25% prefer a larger government with higher taxes).
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munition, allowing corporations to mobilize public opposition.
Hence, keeping the research process privatized is preferable.
This leads to the second option. The FDA could hire inde-
pendent universities and clinical research centersm (CRCs) to per-
form the safety trials. This would maximize efficiency, alleviate pub-
lic concern over government expansion, and still remove conflicts of
interest. Since pharmaceutical companies already use CRCs to con-
duct their safety tests, this may seem like a misguided recommenda-
tion. However, the problem with the current system is that it lacks
independence. Because CRCs contract directly with corporations,
they are unwilling to bite the hand that feeds them. This causes
CRCs to rig the data and draw faulty conclusions. If we can insert
an intermediary into this process, the CRCs incentives will change.
Their goal will no longer be to please the pharmaceutical industry,
but rather, to please the intermediary. The FDA can fill this role
well.
When a corporation submits a new food or drug to the FDA for
approval, the agency will construct the specifications for clinical tri-
als and hold an auction to select the CRC or university lab that will
test the new product. The sponsoring corporation will pay the FDA
the low bid amount, and the FDA will pass this money along to the
winner. The government routinely uses sealed first-price auctions to
grant procurement contracts and to lease the mining rights to
land,7 so there is no reason such a system cannot work in this con-
text.
Naturally, not all CRCs and universities will be permitted to bid
at the auction. If this were not the case, corporations could simply
fund their own CRCs and underbid all the competitors. Instead,
only labs with strict conflict of interest policies will be permitted to
participate. At present, there are nearly a thousand CRCs, so find-
ing a sufficient number of bidders should be easy. Even if few labs
currently meet the FDA's strict standards, a market for independent
CRCs will quickly develop. Also, as noted in the preceding section,
many universities are tightening their rules regarding conflicts of
interest.
275. The FDA defines a clinical research center as "a person [i.e., a legal person,
which may be a corporation] that assumes, as an independent contractor with the
sponsor, one or more of the obligations of a sponsor, e.g., design of a protocol,
selection or monitoring of investigations, evaluation of reports, and preparation of
materials to be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration." 21 CFR 312.3(b).
276. See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. EcON.
LIr. 699, 702 (1987).
2010] 85
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
To promote independence, a blind review process should be
setup. The corporation should not know which CRC is evaluating
its product. Likewise, the CRC should not know which corporation
developed the test substance. Due to the number of companies that
are researching similar drugs, this should not pose a problem, but
even if determined CRCs figure out which corporation's drug they
are testing, they have no incentive to act on that information. Be-
cause of the conflict of interest rules, their loyalties will lie with the
FDA, not the pharmaceutical industry.
When the tests are completed, all data should be made available
for public examination.'" Then the appropriate FDA advisory
committee should review the studies and vote to approve or reject
the product. Because the advisory committees will be composed of
experts in specific fields and will have more time to evaluate indi-
vidual substances, the oversight committee should grant strong def-
erence to the lower committees' decisions. In judicial terms, the
standard of review should be akin to abuse of discretion.
Taken together, these two changes can reform the entire cul-
ture of the FDA. No longer will industry be able to control the food
and drug approval process.
CONCLUSION
In the last half century, an obesity epidemic has swept across
America, leading to a surge in health problems. Excessive sugar
consumption has further aggravated this situation. The problem
persists because the public wants to both trim its waistline and sat-
isfy its sweet tooth. To fill this market, corporations developed a
series of non-caloric artificial sweeteners. It was truly a miracle:
hundreds of times sweeter than sugar and none of the calories. Un-
fortunately, like most things that are too good to be true, artificial
sweeteners came with a heavy price. They may not add extra calo-
ries to your diet, but they will cause a litany of health issues.
Corporations, which stood to make billions if their products
succeeded, hid the dangers of artificial sweeteners from the Ameri-
277. The public overwhelmingly supports this reform. See Consumer Reports,
Consumer Reports Survey Finds Strong Backing for Drug Reforms, http://
www.consumerreports.org/health/prescription-drugs/consumer-reports-survey-finds-
strong-backing-for-drug-reforms-4-07/overview/consumer-reports-survey-finds-strong-
backing-for-drug-reforms.htm (last visited May 23, 2010) ("Ninety-two percent of
Americans agree that pharmaceutical companies should make public the results of
all of their clinical trial studies, which reveal a drug's effectiveness as well as possi-
ble hazardous side effects.").
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can people. Some FDA scientists caught on to this deception and
alerted their superiors. Sadly, the decision makers at the FDA had
serious conflicts of interest. Like the corporations they were sup-
posed to be regulating, these people would profit greatly if the arti-
ficial sweeteners were approved. Quite simply, FDA leaders put
their personal welfare above everyone's safety.
If the FDA is to break free of industry control, reform is neces-
sary.m First, conflict of interest regulations must be strengthened.
The public can only be confident in the FDA's decisions if its leader-
ship does not have ties to corporations. The second proposed
change requires hiring independent organizations to conduct the
clinical trials. Corporations have repeatedly shown that they will
employ deceptive tactics to get their drugs and food additives ap-
proved. Because the profit motive has corrupted their ability to per-
form legitimate studies, corporations should no longer be permitted
to participate in the safety and efficacy tests. America's health is too
important to trust with conflicted actors. To restore the agency's
integrity, industry must be taken out of the FDA.
278. Although this Article focused on the FDA, the recommendations are equally
applicable to other government agencies. Even those that have resisted industry
capture can benefit by adopting more stringent conflict of interest regulations. The
public's perception of the entire government is so poor that every agency has room
to improve its image.
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